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11. Introduction
This study explores relationships between innovative activity, profitability and firm
growth in Norwegian industry. It is based on a dataset which merges information
from the Norwegian Innovation Survey (that is, the Norwegian component of the
Community Innovation Survey 1992) with accounting data for a panel of firms for the
period 1990 (91) to 1994. This allows us to look at profitability and growth over time
in firms engaged in innovative activity in the year 1992, or in firms that introduced
new products in the period 1990-92. It also allows for comparisons with firms not
involved with innovation in this period. Finally, we can investigate whether
profitability in the year preceding our registration of innovative activity seems to
have had any effect on the occurrence or level of innovation.
In doing this, we address a central issue in innovation studies, namely the effects of
innovation on firm performance.  Does it pay off to become involved in innovative
activity? What forms do the benefits of innovation take - does innovation enhance
short-run profitability, or does it contribute to firm growth, or both or neither?
One important point about innovation is that it is not costless: It requires the creation
of tangible and intangible assets which increase production costs; from this
perspective, innovating firms will not necessarily be more profitable, but they will be
more likely to survive and grow. A second basic argument about innovation and firm
performance is that the innovation of new or technically superior products creates
temporary monopolies which improve the business performance of firms. However
such temporary imperfect competition can clearly be exploited in at least two ways.
On the one hand, firms can raise prices on the basis of the performance
improvements in the product, and this ‘imperfect competition’ advantage will lead to
improved returns on sales or on assets. Alternatively, firms can hold prices down,
leading to more or less sharp improvements in the price-quality ratio of the product,
resulting in increasing sales and market shares: in this case profitability (however
measured) may not improve via innovation, but innovation will improve the growth
performance of the firm.
In this paper we show that the latter is the case: that innovating firms in Norway are
not markedly more profitable in terms of rates of return on sales or assets. However
they do have much higher rates of growth of sales (which mean also, of course, that
the absolute amounts of profit grow faster than in non-innovating firms). The impact
of innovation is primarily on market share, not on profit ratios.
Hitherto, questions about returns to innovation have been addressed partly through
case studies, partly through theoretical reasoning and also by econometric
investigation.
Econometric studies have largely been limited to the returns or productivity effect of
one of the components of the innovation costs, namely R&D.1 Perhaps the best
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known example is Edwin Mansfield’s many studies, where rates of return above 20%
are found for many firms and industries.2 This is considerably higher than the
average rates of return on ordinary investments. The social returns on R&D are
usually even higher, as R&D results tend to spill over to users other than the
originators, and it is difficult to appropriate all the gains. Even if these rates differ
from industry to industry, and over time, the general conclusion is that R&D
investments are profitable in aggregate, but of course not always for each single firm
or single project, as the risks involved are usually high.
Since R&D is but one component of the total innovation costs one would expect
estimates of returns to this single component to be too high. The innovation survey
has shown that, in the Norwegian case, only about 50 % of total innovation costs,
including investments, are R&D.3 These additional costs have to be taken into
consideration when estimating rates of return; R&D alone is not sufficient for the
results to come about. Activities such as design, test production and other production
start-up preparations, along with associated investments must be carried out before a
new product or process can be introduced to the market and income starts flowing in.
Including the other components will therefore considerably lower the estimated rates
of return on the total investment in innovation, compared to the returns on the single
component R&D. That is, when the returns are related to the size of the investment.
With the data at hand, we are now able to shed some light on the profitability of the
whole range of innovation costs.
Similar work has been carried out in Finland with a comparable data set.4 With a
different kind of data set, but with many of the same research themes, profitability of
British innovating firms have been studied.5 Results from these analysis are included
for comparisons where appropriate.
Measuring profitability is not an easy task. This is due to the fact that business
accounts are to some extent discretionary for firms. In addition, the time profile for
profits to be earned varies according to industry, type of product and innovation,
market characteristics and so on. This problem is addressed in section 2.2 below. But
there is another problem relating to this; firms may choose to postpone earnings in
terms of profitability in order to expand their market instead. This opens up the
opportunity for higher profits in the future if successful. Such a strategy can be
achieved by, for example, lowering prices temporarily in order to expand sales. We
suspect that in particular small and medium sized firms may choose this option, in
order to obtain the necessary scale of operation for long term survival. In order to
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check whether such behaviour seems to occur, we have included development in
sales as an additional indicator of firm performance.
Innovation is per definition the introduction of something new on the market. This
usually  involves considerable risk. The risk can be technological - one is not able to
achieve the performance expected in the new product or process at the expected cost
- or commercial - if the market does not accept the new product to the desired degree
or at the prevailing price. As a result, failures are part of the game, and the aggregate
results are sums of both successes and failures. For large firms, or society as a whole,
that means handling a portfolio of projects where the central outcome is the net effect
of successes and failures. For a single small firm the result can be growth and/or
profitability, or disaster if a failed project is large relative to the overall size of the
firm. Looking at the whole population of firms in an economy, the disaster of one
firm is not necessarily a problem, as long as there are enough successes to offset the
disasters.
In this study, we mainly apply the perspective of single firms, as we do not have
information covering all relevant firms in Norwegian industry. In reality, firms going
out of business are part of the picture. It has not been possible, however, to include
bankruptcies or firm exit in the analysis - they are simply left of the panel. The
reason is that we don’t always know the reason for exit. Some may actually be
successes, taken over by other companies and therefore ceasing to exist as separate
entries. There is therefore both a positive and a negative effect of these omissions, of
which it is hard to tell the net effect on the analysis of returns on innovative activity.
We have included, however, an analysis of panel dropouts in order to shed some
light on this question. And, even if the main focus is the performance of single firms,
we sum up the results for different sub classes of firms, thereby constructing
“synthetic portfolios” of innovative investments where the net result can be expected
to be positive, even if some of the single firms may experience losses.
The report is organised as follows: Chapter 2 discusses data sources and basic
concepts - in particular the indicators used to measure innovative activity and firm
profitability. In this part we also include a brief analysis of the dropout firms to
evaluate if they are different from the ones remaining in the panel. Chapter 3
addresses the question of whether innovative firms are more or less profitable, or
faster growing than non-innovating firms, and discusses obstacles to innovation
related to problems with financing innovative activity. In chapter 4 we take a closer
look at the innovators, investigating whether the level of innovative activity seems to
be associated with the level of profitability and sales growth. We compare firms with
an emphasis on process versus product innovation, and look at how different kinds of
inputs in the innovation process seem to relate to profits and salesgrowth.
Concluding remarks are collected in chapter 5.

52. Data sources and basic concepts
The core data source for this study is the Norwegian Innovation Survey (equivalent
to the Community Innovation Survey - CIS). To be able to study how innovative
activity relates to profitability and other measures of firm performance, Statistics
Norway have added ordinary accounting data to the innovation data. To study
developments over time, it is necessary to construct a panel where the same firms are
followed over time. In doing so, some of the units are lost. This might cause
problems for the analysis, since dropouts may represent failures (firms going out of
business) as well as successes (where the firm gets bought up by another unit). In this
chapter we discuss these issues, starting with an introduction to the CIS and Oslo
manual approaches to measuring innovation. Next we present the accounting data,
and discuss the important problem of how to measure firm profitability and
performance, before proceeding with the more concrete problems of panel
construction and an analysis of the dropout firms. Are the dropouts different from
those that are kept in the panel in such a way as to disturb the representativeness of
the main panel?
2.1 The CIS approach to innovation
The CIS data collection was carried out in 1993 after a joint initiative from
EUROSTAT and DGXIII of the European Commission. The actual collection and
financing of the effort was left to national authorities, who assigned various
subcontractors to do the work. In the Norwegian case, financing came from the
Research Council of Norway (NFR) and the employers’ association (NHO), and the
survey was carried out by Statistics Norway. At the core of this effort was the “CIS
harmonised questionnaire”, as it was called, including all questions and categories to
be used in the survey. 6 With a few exceptions, this questionnaire adapts the first
version of the “Oslo manual” - a set of recommendations from OECD regarding
collection of innovation data. We will therefore here give a brief summary of the
philosophy and methodology behind the Oslo manual.7
There are essentially two ways of collecting innovation data: the so called “subject
approach”, and the “object approach”. In the latter approach, a single innovation and
its sources and results are studied. In the subject approach, each single firm is
studied, including any innovative project it might have. The last approach is chosen
for CIS, as recommended in the Oslo manual. The method allows aggregation of
activity across industries and countries, and allows international comparison if
sampling is done properly. Another advantage is that all innovative activity is
included, successes as well as failures. As pointed out above, failures are
unavoidable in the innovative process. And lastly, firms without innovative activity
are included, allowing for comparisons between those active and those inactive in
innovation - a matter of great importance for policy making.
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7
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The Oslo manual relates explicitly to the other manuals in the OECD family of
manuals relating to science and technology data. In particular, the Frascati manual on
measurement of expenditures for R&D is taken as a starting point. In the Oslo
manual definition of innovations costs, the Frascati definition of R&D is included.
That means that, in principle, all other innovation costs components specified in the
Oslo manual are additional to R&D. In practice, however, it seems difficult for the
companies to make this distinction, and results from Frascati and Oslo-type surveys
are therefore not compatible. Results show a smaller amount of R&D in innovation
surveys than in Frascati-based surveys, making one suspect that non-R&D activity is
included in the Frascati-based numbers. On the other hand, one might argue that
innovation surveys are new to the firms, with unfamiliar concepts and breakdowns.
R&D as a concept, and the concrete surveys, have been around for thirty-five years
or so. At the present time there is not much more to do than accept the present
numbers and be warned about possible problems with how firms interpret the
questions.
There is a general problem of accuracy and reliability when collecting data through
survey questionnaires, in particular when the questions do not match readily
available data in the firms. This is the case with the innovation survey, as most firms
do not keep a record of either innovation inputs or outputs. In effect the answers
cannot be treated as accurate measures, but rather as well-informed estimates by the
people responsible in the firms. Or, as one might put it, as indicators of the activity
going on. In addition, there are several questions asking for opinions or more
qualitative information about the firm and its activities. Such information is highly
dependent upon who the respondent is, and what function he or she has in the
organisation. On the other hand, many issues relating to innovation is not available as
“hard data”, and surveying or interviewing collecting more or less qualitative
information is the only possible source. As the same technique has been applied in a
series of countries, and most results seem to be relatively consistent across both
countries and industries, we believe them to give a reasonable picture of reality.8
The data collected through CIS can be divided into these categories: general
background information, innovation inputs and innovation outputs, along with more
qualitative information on innovation goals, sources of information, technology
transfers and obstacles to innovation. All of this information cannot be utilised in this
report, but we hope to include most of what we find of relevance to the main
question about the relationship between innovation and profitability. Of particular
interest are of course the direct costs related to innovation, and their relation to
profitability. Costs are broken down into six categories, of which the first is R&D as
discussed above. The others are product design, trial production, (training and)
tooling up, acquisition of patents and licenses, market analysis (excluding launch
costs) and “other costs”.9 In addition, firms are asked to specify total amounts spent
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 For an evaluation of the CIS approach, see Archibugi, Daniele, P. Cohendet, A. Kristensen and K.-
A. Schäffer: Evaluation of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) - Phase I. EIMS publication No.
11, Luxembourg 1994.
9
 One should be aware that the Norwegian application of this question is somewhat different from this,
as “training” is left out, and “patents” is replaced with the term “products”.
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on investments in machinery and equipment linked to innovation (actual outlay in the
year under study).
A new feature in the Oslo manual was the attempt to measure the output of
innovative activity directly. As this was the first version of a manual for collection of
innovation data, the Oslo manual concentrated on what is thought to be most easily
measured; product innovations. Even if the manual generally covers all kinds of
innovation except organisational change, it is limited to products on the results side.
Concretely, the companies were asked to estimate the share of total sales stemming
from products that had been changed over the last few years (in CIS, limited to the
last three years). A distinction was also made between major innovations and
incremental innovations, by the degree of change in the product. A further distinction
was made between products new to the firm, and products new to the industry. This
is a direct measure of innovative results, not hampered by for example tax
considerations that play a role in making up the accounts. Profits, on the other hand,
reported in the accounts, include results from all of a firm’s activities, many of which
are not related to innovation. Nevertheless, bottom line profits is the goal of most
companies, and one should expect to find some correlation between new product
sales and profits. This question is addressed later in this report.
2.2 Firm profitability
A central idea behind this study is that there exist some kinds of links between
innovative activity and the results achieved by firms in terms of economic outcome.
This link is probably bi-directional - that is, economic results may influence
innovation, and innovation may affect economic results. We address both these
possibilities here, although the effects on economic results are given the larger share
of attention. For both approaches, however, it is vital how economic results are
understood and measured.
Due to the limited availability of data we have to use financial accounts as the source
for indicators of economic results. This is certainly better than what has been
available so far, as a linked data set like the one we use has hardly been available
anywhere before.10 However, it is still necessary to consider what we actually
measure through the accounts. In this section we present the financial accounts and
discuss their interpretation and reliability.
All accounting data are reported due to regulations in Norwegian law. The accounts
are generally constructed for purposes other than obtaining true measures of
economic performance from a statistical point of view, with their function as a basis
for extracting taxes probably being one of the most important. Since economic
results are taxed on a yearly basis there is an incentive for firms to report this figure
as low as possible every year. Besides, this information helps the firms themselves to
keep track of their performance, as well as outsiders such as more or less anonymous
investors. Of course, most firms keep track of their performance in more detail in
their internal accounting, but such information has not been available to us.
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In order to avoid problems stemming from tax-motivated dispositions, we have
chosen to use quite simple measures of profit. The first one is simply operating
profit, defined as the net difference between sales and ordinary operating costs
excluding financial items and depreciation. It is used as a rate, that is, as a percentage
of sales.
This measure captures the performance of ordinary production in the companies,
regardless of how the results are split between dividend, retained earnings or other
expenditures like financial items. One could say it relates to the “technological”
aspects of operations; the “pure” manufacturing part of running the firms. Interpreted
in this way, operating profits   capture the essence of what we are looking for when
analysing innovations.
One should note, however, that there are elements in both costs and earnings that are
not included in this measure - elements which are necessarily part of any firm’s
operations. These include dividends paid to the owners of the company - a cost the
firm must bear in order to pay for the capital invested; financial costs - also payment
for invested capital and other funding by borrowing; and depreciation - the cost of
wearing out or using machinery and buildings. The latter is hard to estimate, and in
practice it is based on administrative rules which may be an advantage or
disadvantage for the firms, but rarely close to the economic reality of “true”
depreciation. On the income side there are net gains from financial dispositions or
income from selling or renting out part of the firm or its property. As a result of this,
firms with a positive operating profit may come out with a negative or considerably
lower taxable annual result, or vice versa. The sum, however, is a rather fuzzy
picture that demands detailed investigation of each single account. It is not possible
for us due to the time and resources available. That is why we have chosen to use the
simple measure of operating profit.
Another way of comparing results between firms is to relate earnings to the total
assets involved in production - in other words, to the value of capital involved in the
firms. We use such a measure as our second indicator for profitability; return on total
assets. It is defined as profits exclusive of extraordinary items but including net
financial items and depreciation, as a percentage of total assets (rather than total
sales, as for operating profit rate). This measure thus includes some of the “fuzzy”
items described above. It is included to investigate whether the results are sensitive
to the measure of profitability used, so that results can be evaluated using both
approaches.
Although the two measures of profitability may indicate different performance levels
for individual firms depending on the measure applied, the two are in general highly
correlated and they show the same pattern of development for groups of companies
in most of our analysis. We interpret this as a sign of robustness in our data which
strengthens our confidence in the results.
The third and last measure of performance included is simply the development over
time in sales. Expanding the market share is usually a goal for the firms, as a means
for subsequent increases in profits. In particular for smaller, and newly established
firms, increasing the scale of operation may be given higher priority than short term
profits. As market share data are not available to us we simply use total sales as our
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indicator. It can be interpreted both as an indicator of success in the marketplace and
of the scale of operation.
Before presenting the actual analysis, we must consider some systematic differences
between firms that may affect the results. The most important is perhaps differences
in technological opportunity between different industries.11 In some industries, like
computers or pharmaceuticals, there are rapid technological changes taking place -
partly based on new scientific knowledge that allows new solutions to be applied in
innovation. In other industries, many of them mature and long lasting, the technology
is quite fixed and the potential for improvement is more limited. This of course
affects both the level of investment in innovative activity, the share of new products
in sales, the development over time in sales and the profitability of firms. In fact it is
not necessarily the case that profits are higher among the most innovative industries -
they have to reinvest large parts of their surplus in search of even better solutions. In
mature industries, on the other hand, market structure is usually settled and market
power and economies of scale comes into play in a different manner. Even among
the more dynamic industries there are important differences. Comparing computers
and pharmaceuticals we find that the latter may spend up to 10 or 15 years on
developing a new generation of drugs, whereas computers are replaced by new
models every six moths or so. As a result, the intervals between innovative
investments being made until results show up on the balance sheets vary greatly.
Thus we must expect differences in the time profile of profitability.
All this makes comparison difficult. Ideally one should always control for industry,
but the number of observations available makes this option impossible in many
cases. The long time lag for results to show up creates a need for long time series to
capture all effects. On the other hand, with a long time lag it is hard to establish a
clear relationship between the initial action and subsequent results, as additional
factors come into play. Innovation for many firms is a more or less permanent
activity, and even if we only have recorded innovative investments for one year, this
one observation may be a reasonable indicator of the general level of such activity in
the firms over a longer time period. Thus it should be possible to distinguish firms
with and without innovation, and firms with different kinds of innovation, to see
whether they differ in economic performance, even if the time series is limited.
Summing up this discussion, we must expect a lot of “noise” in the data, reflecting
factors we are not able to include in the analysis. Therefore it is unlikely that the
relationships we do uncover will be very strong ones. We do think, however, that
looking for a relationship between innovation and profitability is worthwhile  and
necessary, and that our methodology will help us to do so.
                                                
11
 For a good discussion of this concept and related terms, see Rod Coombs: Technological
opportunities and industrial organisation, in Dosi & al (eds): Technical change and economic theory.
Pinter Publishers, London and New York, 1988.
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2.3 Description of data
2.3.1 Panel construction
The data of the panel consist of the Norwegian innovation survey 1992 and statistics
of financial accounts 1990-94. The aim has been to find a match for the firms which
responded in the innovation survey from the statistics of accounts. The gross sample
of enterprises in the innovation survey in manufacturing industry was 1 848. The
sample was constructed to be representative of total industry. All enterprises with
100 or more employees were included, for enterprises between 5-9, 10-49 and 50-99
the sampling fractions were 20, 30 and 50 per cent respectively. In all, 953
enterprises, or 52 %, responded. The sample covered also mining and quarrying, but
industry here refers to manufacturing only, that is NACE classes 15-37.12
As for the statistics of financial accounts, there are two main sources of data. First,
we have register data based on annual balance sheet figures which firms send to the
administrative body (“Brønnøysund-registeret”). The second source is the statistics
of accounts survey of Statistics Norway. Statistics Norway data are collected from
enterprises by mail survey. The survey in industry covers all enterprises with at least
100 employees. In addition, based on these data, Statistics Norway maintains a panel
of large enterprises (100 or more employees)  which are considered to have remained
identical over time.
The sources of data for financial accounts in the panels are:
1990-94: Statistics Norway's identical enterprise panel (100 or more employees)
1991-94: Those in the panel above, Statistics Norway; others from the register
Thus, we have two panels, 1990-94 for big enterprises and a shorter one, 1991-94 for
enterprises without size restriction. As for the contents of the two data, although the
extent differs, the definitions of key variables of interest are identical.
The statistical unit is enterprise (a legal unit) which is identified by enterprise code.
The linking of different data sets within and between the years under study is done
by enterprise code and by checking the name and change in sales. In the case of no
match by the code a firm is dropped from the panel. As for the change of sales, only
vague criteria have been applied. Annual increases no greater than doubling and
decreases less than 50 per cent are allowed. This is to control the fact that despite the
same code and name there might have been a major change in the structure or
activities of enterprise. However, if the firm is included in the Statistics Norway's
identical enterprise panel, it is included in our panel as well, no matter how big a
change in sales has been.
A well-known problem with longitudinal data like enterprise panels is attrition. The
structure of the economy or individual enterprises is not static. New enterprises are
                                                
12
 Details of survey methodology in: Frengen, Geir, Foyn, Frank and Ragnarsøn, Richard (1995)
Innovation in Norwegian Manufacturing and Oil Extraction in 1992. Statistics Norway, Reports
95/26. Ragnarsøn, Richard (1994) Innovasjonvirksomheten: Dokumentasjon av
innovasjonundersøkelsen 1993. Statistisk sentralbyrå, Notater 94/19.
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born, old ones fall into bankruptcy and as a result of reorganisation of activities there
may be a split or merger. One way to classify the possible changes is presented in
Table 2.1 (see also Struijs and Willeboordse 1995).13 This section also draws on the
experiences gained in the recent corresponding panel survey of Finnish
manufacturing industry (Husso, Leppälahti and Niininen 1996). 14
Table 2.1. The enterprise as a statistical unit, classification of change
Type of change Unit’s identity
retained
1. No change or a minor change in characteristics Yes
2. Existence
2.1 Birth No
2.2.Death No
3. Structural change
3.1 Concentration
3.1.1 Merger with another No
3.1.2 Acquisition of a new part Yes
3.2 Division
3.2.1 Disintegration No
3.2.2 Splitting off a part Yes
3.3 Other structural change Yes or No
Enterprises included in our panel can be placed into the classes 1., 3.1.2, 3.2.2 or 3.3.
These are the cases in which the identity according to enterprise code has been
retained. The problem remains, that identity in accordance with the enterprise code
may have been retained even though the structure and activities of an enterprise have
changed considerably. For example, an enterprise may reorganise its activities by
establishing new subsidiary companies which get their own enterprise codes (class
2.1) while the original enterprise code is retained by the parent company (class
3.2.2), which, however, concentrates solely on the management of the new
subsidiary enterprises (or interlocking group of enterprises). That is why additional
checks are required, which in our case is the proportional change in sales.
2.3.2 Data coverage and panel dropouts
As the innovation survey forms the basis of the panel, the coverage is evaluated in
relation to the net sample, i.e. those firms which responded to the innovation survey.
That is, problems related to the coverage and representativeness of the innovation
survey itself are not considered here. A renewed industrial classification, NACE on
2-digit level, has been used in the construction of the panel and this makes the
number of enterprises in some classes as well as in industry total a little different
                                                
13
 Struijs, P. & A. Willeboordse, (1995). Changes in populations of statistical units. In Cox, B.G.,
D.A. Binder, B.N. Chinnappa, A. Christianson, M.J. Colledge & P.S. Kott (eds.): Business Survey
Methods, 65-84. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
14
 Husso K., Leppälahti A., Niininen P. (1996) R&D, Innovation and Firm Performance. Studies on
the Panel Data of Finnish Manufacturing Firms. Statistics Finland, Science and Technology 1996:3.
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from the original survey. For manufacturing industry (NACE 15-37), there are 916
observations. Excluding firms with missing code and after deleting a few double
codes (an enterprise had split its response to the innovation survey), we have 908
firms to start with (Figure 2.1.). Out of these 85 are lost because of  no match
between the innovation survey and statistics of financial accounts data by enterprise
code in 1992. Controlling for the difference in sales between innovation and
accounting data (in this case ±50 %  since we have the same year) we are left with
806 pairs of manufacturing firms, 89 per cent of respondents in the innovation
survey. Sales control here is to ensure that the response in both surveys refers to the
same unit, given the code. Years 1991 and 1993-94 are then added in the way
described above, and the final panel consists of 640 enterprises, or 70 per cent of the
enterprises in the original net sample. The number of enterprise pairs between the
1990-94 panel of large enterprises and the innovation survey  is 145.
Figure 2.1. Combined data sets 1991-94, number of enterprises included
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In comparison to the original net sample of the innovation survey, we find for the
size class more than 50 employees a slightly higher proportion of innovative firms
(Table 2.2.). The coverage of the panel in terms of enterprises retained is lowest with
small enterprises. An obvious explanation is that small firms are more likely to face
bankruptcy or acquisition by another enterprise than larger ones and consequently the
probability of falling out of the panel is higher.
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Table 2.2. The coverage of the panel 1991-94, comparison to the original net sample
of 1992 innovation survey
Original
net sample
Number of
firms in the
panel
Coverage of
the panel
Proportion of
innovative firms
(net sample)
Proportion of
innovative firms
(panel)
Size N Percent
ALL 908 640 70 40 43
1-19 409 268 66 19 20
20-49 157 111 71 39 39
50-99 125 90 72 56 59
100- 217 171 77 71 74
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the enterprises of the 1991-94 panel broken down by size,
industry and key innovation variables.
Table 2.3 Basic figures of the panel 1991-94 according to the size of firm
Number of
firms
Number of
firms
No
innovations
Innovations Product
innovations
Process
innovations
R&D
activities
N
ALL 640 364 276 188 234 164
1-19 268 214 54 35 38 26
20-49 111 68 43 29 35 21
50-99 90 37 53 40 46 35
100- 171 45 126 84 115 82
Table 2.4 Basic figures of the panel 1991-94 according to industry
NACE Number of
firms
No
innovations
Innovations Product
innovations
Process
innovations
R&D
activities
N
ALL 640 364 276 188 234 164
15 102 57 45 28 38 25
16 1 . 1 1 1 1
17 21 14 7 7 6 5
18 8 6 2 2 2 1
19 5 2 3 . 3 .
20 45 34 11 8 11 2
21 18 5 13 8 12 9
22 99 60 39 8 38 12
24 13 2 11 10 11 10
25 15 9 6 5 5 4
26 34 20 14 12 10 10
27 18 7 11 6 10 7
28 71 53 18 11 16 10
29 55 24 31 28 24 21
31 20 9 11 9 9 9
32 9 3 6 6 3 6
33 10 3 7 7 4 7
34 13 5 8 8 4 7
35 43 29 14 9 12 8
36 40 22 18 15 15 10
As can be seen, the analysis cannot be carried out all the way on the NACE 2-digit
level. Some industrial classes have to be put together.
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In the panel of identical enterprises of more than 100 employees 1990-94, the
proportion of innovators is 75 per cent (Table 2.5.), which is in accordance with
Table 2.2. In particular, the proportion of process innovators is high. According to
number of firms, the largest branches are food, transport equipment and printing and
publishing.
Table 2.5. Basic figures of the identical enterprise panel 1990-94 according to
industry. Number of firms.
NACE N No
innovations
Innovations Product
innovations
Process
innovations
R&D
activities
ALL 145 37 108 70 100 70
15 22 6 16 7 15 8
17 5 1 4 4 3 3
19 1 . 1 . 1 .
20 6 3 3 3 3 1
21 12 2 10 7 10 8
22 19 7 12 3 11 4
24 8 1 7 6 7 6
25 5 1 4 3 4 2
26 8 1 7 5 6 5
27 9 .1 8 4 8 5
28 5 1 4 2 4 3
29 9 2 7 6 6 5
31 6 . 6 5 5 5
32 1 . 1 1 1 1
33 3 . 3 3 2 3
34 5 . 5 5 4 5
35 16 10 6 3 6 3
36 5 1 4 3 4 3
In Table 2.6 we take a closer look at the panel dropouts. Out of 823 enterprises for
which a match between innovation and accounting data were found in 1992, 640 are
retained in our panel while 183 firms fall out. The largest group of dropouts consist
of firms for which the change in sales has been out of the limits allowed.15 The
remaining 76 enterprises were tracked down in the enterprise register. These have
been classified into two groups; “ceased” and “new code”. Ceased means that firms
has closed down its activities, in most cases due to bankruptcy. New code is
somewhat more complicated, it includes for example cases in which a firm has
merged with another or those in which a firm has disintegrated and its activities have
continued in new companies. From the point of view of technology studies, it would
be interesting to know, for instance, if a small firm has been acquired by a larger one
because of its know-how in technology, which would imply that the small firm has in
fact been successful in its innovation activities even though it has discontinued.
However, this kind of analysis has not been possible here.
                                                
15
 The limits are set to annual doubling or reduction by 50 % or more.
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Table 2.6. The panel 1991-94 and the panel dropouts according to their
characteristics in 1992
N Employees Proportion
of innovators
Operating
profit
Return on
total assets
mean % median (%) median (%)
In panel 640 112 43 4,2 10,0
Dropout in all 183 142 33 2,3 5,2
Ceased 48 74 21 2,4 8,7
New code 28 141 43 2,9 6,9
Change in sales 107 170 36 1,9 3,6
As was found earlier, enterprises included in the panel have a higher proportion of
innovators than dropouts. They also have clearly higher profits, as indicated by
operating profit ratio and return on total assets. For the dropouts, the firms which
have closed down activities are smaller than average and consequently have a lower
proportion of innovators. Firms which drop out because of the change in sales are on
average bigger, they have lower profits and the proportion of innovators is a little
lower than among those remaining in the panel. Interestingly, in the group ’new code’
the proportion of innovators is relatively high (even accounting for the average size).
As explained above, this group can include successful innovators even though they
have dropped out of the panel.
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3. Do profit rates differ between innovators and non-
innovators?
3.1 Innovation output and the rate of profit 1990-94
The question we deal with here is whether the profit rate of innovators (firms that
reported product or process innovations for the period 1990-92) and non-innovators
differ in our two panels. Profits are indicated by OPR (operating profit ratio) and
ROTA (return on total assets). As we know, the profit rate of a firm can vary
considerably from one year to another. Because the focus here is on the effects of
innovation, we will exclude the most extreme fluctuations from time series, which
apparently are due to other, more short-term factors than innovation activities. Thus,
in order to be included in the analysis, the profit rate of a firm has to fulfil limits ±30
for OPR and −30,+50 for ROTA each year. This restriction is used throughout
Chapter 3. This has no really big effect - for OPR 10 firms, or 1,6 per cent, fall
outside the limits. Corresponding figures for ROTA are 21 firms or 3,3 per cent.
Even after cutting off the outliers the distributions of profit rates remain skewed.
This is why median is used instead of mean. However, where the number of
observations is greater, for instance when looking at industry total, median and mean
are very close to each other. Further, the figures presented are ’unweighted’, i.e. each
firm contributes with its median, independent of the volume of profit or loss. We first
take a look at the development of profits at total industry level.
Figure 3.1 Average operating profit ratio (median) 1991-94 according to innovation
activities, all industry
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Figure 3.1 presents the OPR in the 1991-94 panel. As can be seen, the profits of
innovators are somewhat greater until 1993, when any significant difference
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practically disappears. Figure 3.2 shows the corresponding development for ROTA.
It is immediately clear that measured by this indicator, there is no difference between
the two groups. Thus, for the industry total, innovation output does not have an
impact on profitability in our panel.
Figure 3.2 Return on total assets (median) 1991-94 according to innovation
activities, all industry
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Although innovations seem to have little or no effect on profit level in the industry as
a whole, we will still pursue the usual breakdowns such as firm size and main
economic activity. We first tackle the effect of firm size, using the identical
enterprise panel of Statistics Norway. This covers enterprises with more than 100
employees and is one year longer than our panel for all enterprises. Figures 3.3 and
3.4 present developments in OPR and ROTA respectively. The conclusion is quite
obvious: except for 1993 (especially with ROTA, somewhat less with OPR)
innovators show consistently higher profits. Further, for the OPR, the difference
grows considerably in 1994.
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Figure 3.3 Operating profit ratio (median) large enterprise panel 1990-94 according
to innovation activities, industry
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Figure 3.4 Return on total assets (median) large enterprise panel 1990-94 according
to innovation activities, industry
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The profit levels for other size groups are shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Considering
both OPR and ROTA, the results for size groups 1-19 and 20-49 are inconclusive.
No systematic difference between innovators and non-innovators can be found. The
group 50-99 employees, however, follows much the same pattern as the large
enterprise panel. Further, it seems that the difference in favour of innovators
increases with time. Thus, the results suggest that innovation output, firm size and
profit are related in such a way that among firms with more than 50 employees,
innovators show greater profit than non-innovators. With small enterprises on the
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other hand, profit rate seems to be more or less independent of firms’ innovation
activities. This may, however, be a result of selectivity, too. For example,
unsuccessful small enterprises fall out of the panel because of bankruptcy while
successful ones may be bought by larger enterprises. Thus, the group of small firms
is - to a greater degree than large firms - in a state of flux due to entries and exits, a
factor which cannot be handled by panel. This could be one reason why we are not
able to detect permanent difference in profitability between innovators and non-
innovators.
Table 3.1 Operating profit ratio (median) 1991-94 according to innovation activities
and size, firms with less than 100 employees
Size
Year 1-19 20-49 50-99
Innovation No
Innovation
Innovation No
innovation
Innovation No
innovation
1991 4,4 3,5 3,0 3,8 3,4 3,1
1992 4,1 3,8 3,9 3,7 4,8 4,1
1993 3,8 4,6 4,5 4,7 4,9 3,0
1994 5,0 5,5 4,1 3,6 4,9 2,7
(n=51) (n=212) (n=42) (n=68) (n=52) (n=37)
Table 3.2 Return on total assets (median) 1991-94 according to innovation activities
and size, firms with less than 100 employees
Size
Year 1-19 20-49 50-99
Innovation No
Innovation
Innovation No
innovation
Innovation No
innovation
1991 11,5 9,3 7,3 8,6 7,5 8,8
1992 11,2 10,2 9,8 9,0 10,3 10,3
1993 11,3 10,6 9,5 10,3 11,3 7,9
1994 11,5 11,8 8,3 8,8 9,6 7,2
(n=52) (n=201) (n=42) (n=67) (n=53) (n=36)
We now turn to the effects of industry by breaking down the data according to
industrial classification. Only some selected results are discussed here. Detailed
figures can be found in the appendix Table A.1. It should be emphasised that
industry level analysis is hampered by skewed distribution of profit variables and the
rather small number of enterprises in some industrial classes. The small number of
observations also means that controlling for size on the industry level could not be
done.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 present the difference in profit rates between innovators and non-
innovators. Positive values mean that innovators have higher profits, while negative
values indicate higher profits for non-innovators. Perhaps surprisingly, there is a
difference, even increasing over time, in the profit rate in favour of innovators in
printing and publishing (NACE class 22). This is traditionally considered a low-tech
industry, as measured by R&D intensity or proportion of innovating firms, for
instance. In contrast, the electrical equipment and instruments industries (NACE 30-
33), in which R&D intensity and proportion of innovators are high, non-innovators
show slightly higher profits. The difference with ROTA is not stable, but here again
we see an increase in 1994. Other industries in which non-innovators had  higher
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profit rates than innovators were wood, wood products, pulp and paper (NACE 20-
21) and textiles and clothing. Greater R&D intensity and profits amongst innovators
coincide in the chemical, rubber and plastics industries (NACE 24-25). Innovators
also showed somewhat higher profit levels in manufacture of other non-metallic
mineral products. Remaining industries showed no marked or constant differences,
as for example food (15-16) and metal and metal products (27-28) in the appendix
Table A.2.
Figure 3.5 Operating profit ratio (median). The difference between innovators and
non-innovators in some industrial classes.1
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Figure 3.6 Return on total assets (median). The difference between innovators and
non-innovators in some industrial classes.
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Besides the problems of data coverage, there are two further aspects to consider.
Firstly, the lag before innovations become profitable is certainly different in different
industries. Secondly, intramural R&D is not the only input indicator of innovation
activity. One channel of technological diffusion is acquired technology in the form of
process innovations developed by another industry. This may well be the case here
with printing and publishing. All this makes industry-level analysis complex, even if
we possessed more extensive data.
3.2 The development of firm performance
In the previous section we focused on the differences in average profit rates. We now
turn to the question of differences in the development of innovators and non-
innovators. The first focus is on the persistence of profit rates, i.e. how well profits in
the beginning of the period predict the profit rates of following years. Another aspect
we take a look at is the development of sales. Although not directly related to
profitability, it indicates how successful a firm has been in enlarging its activities.
And, of course, it can be assumed that introduction of new products to the market or
improvement of production methods will in due course be reflected in an increase in
sales.
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Profit rate and innovation output may be related in ways other than that innovations
simply indicate higher profit. It has been proposed (Geroski, 1993 and 1995)16 that
the performance of innovative firms is more persistent, and that they are less
vulnerable, e.g., to cyclical downturns. According to this argument, what matters is
the process of innovation which makes firms more flexible when adjusting to
external incidents like demand or supply shocks.
The persistence of profit rate has been analysed for our two panels by taking
correlations of the first year's profit with the following years’ profit rates. Table 3.3
presents the results from the large enterprise panel 1990-94.
Table 3.3 Correlations of OPR and ROTA 1990 with OPR and ROTA 1991-94. Large
enterprises panel
OPR
N 1991 1992 1993 1994
All 142 .59 .42 .35 .31
(**) (**) (**) (**)
Innovations 107 .58 .46 .40 .38
(**) (**) (**) (**)
No innovations 35 .65 .29 .11 .03
(**)
ROTA
N 1991 1992 1993 1994
All 143 .60 .35 .29 .22
(**) (**) (**) (**)
Innovations 106 .59 .30 .23 .23
(**) (**) (*) (*)
No innovations 37 .59 .41 .43 .19
(**) (*) (**)
** p<.01; *.01<= p <= .05
As could be expected, the first year's  profit correlates positively with the profits of
following years even with the lag of five years. For OPR, the correlation is stronger
for innovators than non-innovators. The ROTA conclusions are not so clear; 1992-93
non-innovators have higher correlations but in 1994 there is a difference in favour of
innovators.
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 Geroski, P (1995): Innovations and competitive advantage. OECD, Economic Department Working
Papers No. 159.
Geroski, P.; Machin, S. and Reenen J. (1993): The profitability of innovating firms. RAND Journal of
Economics, Vol 24, No 2.
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Table 3.4 Correlations of OPR and ROTA 1991 with OPR and ROTA 1992-94. Firms
with less than 100 employees.
OPR
N 1992 1993 1994
All 458 .42 .34 .34
(**) (**) (**)
Innovations 143 .21 .28 .28
(* ) (**) (**)
No innovations 315 .51 .37 .36
(**) (**) (**)
ROTA
N 1992 1993 1994
All 451 .36 .26 .20
(**) (**) (**)
Innovations 147 .38 .29 .22
(**) (**) (**)
No innovations 304 .35 .25 .19
(**) (**) (**)
** p<.01; *.01<= p <= .05
For smaller firms the panel is one-year shorter. All the correlations are positive and
significant. For OPR, non-innovators do have stronger correlations, but the figures
for innovators are confusing, with the correlation coefficient increasing slightly after
1992.
The result that there is no difference between the two groups is perhaps not
surprising. In order to be able to adequately assess the hypothesis of persistence of
profit, longer time series would be required. Besides the usual problem concerning
the lags of innovation output, this would help to deal with the impact of short-term
economic fluctuations.
With the development of sales there is a striking difference between small and large
firms. The change in sales is calculated by setting sales 1991=100 (1990=100 in the
case of large enterprise panel). Here each firm weights according to its volume of
sales, and thus the overall figures match quite closely to the group of large
enterprises. As for the large enterprises (Table 3.5), non-innovators have clearly had
more rapid increase in sales in the beginning of the period, but levels of sales start to
decrease in 1994. This can be seen also from Table 3.6, in which we have a shorter
panel for all enterprises. Interestingly, in the analysis of persistence of profit, the
correlation coefficient for the year 1994 dropped as well (Table 3.3. above).
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Table 3.5 The development of sales 1990-94 (1990=100, nominal prices) by
innovation output. Large enterprise panel.
N 1991 1992 1993 1994
Index 1990=100
All 145 100,3 102,3 104,4 108,9
Innovations 108 98,6 98,7 100,8 107,5
No innovations 37 114,3 132,2 134,8 120,2
Results are more consistent for enterprises with less than 100 employees, with
innovators showing constantly faster increase in sales. This is especially the case for
size-classes 20-49 and 50-99 employees. The results for small enterprises can be
related to the development of profitability in Section 3.1. It was found that for small
firms the profit rate between innovators and non-innovators did not differ, either
cross-sectionally or over time, while for large firms it did. One way to interpret this
is that what matters with innovation for small firms is growth, while for large firms it
is return in terms of profits. The importance of growth for small firms is also
reflected amongst non-innovating small firms for which the growth of sales has been
faster than non-innovating large firms.
Table 3.6 The development of sales 1991-94 (1991=100, nominal prices) by number
of employees and innovation output.
Size N 1992 1993 1994
Index 1991=100
All Innovations 276 100,9 104,2 112,3
No innovations 364 109,4 108,4 104,2
1-19 Innovations 54 105,1 110,1 120,8
No innovations 214 101,1 102,4 115,8
20-49 Innovations 43 107,4 116,1 134,5
No innovations 68 100,1 100,5 109,0
50-99 Innovations 53 104,0 108,6 121,7
No innovations 37 103,0 97,9 101,9
100- Innovations 126 100,6 103,6 111,2
No innovations 45 114,0 113,4 101,9
3.3 Profit and problems of finance as obstacles to innovation
Above, we examined whether innovation output has an impact on profit rates or on
firm performance. But we can also put the question the other way around, i.e. does
profit have an impact on the propensity of a firm to engage in innovation activities?
If a firm is struggling with economic difficulties, indicated by low profit, it may be
less inclined to undertake risky projects such as innovation. On the other hand,
economic difficulties might be an incentive to start searching for new solutions. The
data at our disposal presents a weakness here, namely the time-span covered; the
decision to invest in innovation is a matter of the long-term development of a firm
and is not likely to be made on the basis of one year’s profit alone. In the data
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available, innovation output refers to the period 1990-92 and the first year for the
profit rate is 1991. However, as we have seen, the profit rates of adjacent years
correlate quite strongly, so it is perhaps not misleading to rely on one year’s profit
data alone.
We can assume that profit rates correlate positively with the possibilities for internal
financing of innovation activities. It should be noted that this is a proportional
measure, and does not as such indicate the extent of potential internal sources of
funds for innovation. In this sense cash flow, the most widely used measure of
internal financial capability, may be more accurate. We present some results for cash
flow also and define it as net annual result (result after taxes, depreciation and other
financial items). Internal financial capability is the traditional explanation for the
frequent observation that innovation (or R&D) activities are more common in large
enterprises than in smaller ones.17 The argument is that larger, more diversified firms
are better able to bear the risks and uncertainties involved in innovation activities and
are less dependent on external debt.
Besides being an indicator of internal financial capabilities, profit rate is likely to be
positively correlated with external sources as well. Unfortunately the impact of
external sources of finance cannot be dealt with explicitly, due to the lack of data on
sources of funding for innovation activities. But profit rate may also be a signal to
the providers of risk capital, which is often needed to finance innovation activities
which are generally of uncertain outcome.
We can also make use of valuable additional information from the innovation survey,
in which respondents were asked about financial barriers to innovation activities. The
inclusion of barriers was limited to those which had actually had some impact, i.e.
had prevented realisation of at least some innovation activities during 1990-92. Of
special interest here is 'lack of appropriate sources of finance' which was rated
according to its importance on a scale from 1 (insignificant) to 5 (crucial). We thus
have an overview of how firms themselves perceive their financial possibilities for
innovation, or in other words, an overview of how far these barriers prevent
innovation. The levels of financial problems reported indicate that firms could
potentially have introduced a greater number of innovations than they did.
The data we use here is the combined 1991-92 dataset. This is basically larger than
our 1991-94 panel (because of attrition), but on the other hand, there is a
considerable degree of non-response for the question concerning financial sources.
Thus we have 568 responses, which is 83 per cent of the responses in the original net
sample. For background information, Table 3.7 presents percentages of responses to
the ‘sources of finance’ obstacle according to importance attached, firm-size and
innovation activity. As we might expect, financial barriers are considered to be more
important for small firms than large ones. There are no marked differences between
innovators and non-innovators. Looking at size-categories we see that a greater share
of innovative firms with fewer than 20 employees consider this obstacle to be
‘important’. However, there is no difference between innovative and non-innovative
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 Cohen, Wesley (1995): Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity. In Stoneman, P. (ed.): The
Handbook of Economics of Innovation and Technological Change. Blackwell Publishers. Oxford.
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firms when we look at the responses ‘important’ and ‘of medium importance’
together. In all, ‘sources of finance’ as a barrier is relevant for both groups; it may
have prevented innovation activities (non-innovators) or have limited further
innovations (innovators).
Table 3.7 Sources of finance as a barrier to innovation activity by size
Innovations No innovations
Size N Not
important
Of
medium
impor-
tance
Important N Not
important
Of
medium
impor-
tance
Important
Percent Percent
ALL 268 52 17 31 300 44 21 34
1-19 47 36 13 51 167 37 25 38
20-49 47 36 28 36 59 41 22 37
50-99 59 49 31 20 35 57 23 20
100+ 115 66 8 26 39 69 5 26
In Table 3.8. the importance of source of finance is classified as above and further
broken down by variables on innovation output and firm size. Looking at totals,
Figure 3.8 is much as expected in the sense that firms which reported financial
problems as important barriers to innovation also tend to have lower profit rates. This
is true for both innovators and non-innovators as well as for ROTA and OPR. The
only exception to this is the group small innovating firms with fewer than 20
employees, for which there is no such connection. In accordance with what we
established in Section 3.1, profit rates between innovators and non-innovators do not
markedly differ even when classified according to degree of importance. But there is
an interesting modification by size. Amongst those firms with less than 20 employees
that reported ‘source of finance’ as an important problem, non-innovators have lower
profit rates. The size-group 20-49 employees displays a contradictory result, with
non-innovators showing higher than average profit rates (there are a few other
importance classes with big difference in the profit rate between innovators and non-
innovators, but these have only a small number of observations and are very
uncertain).
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Table 3.8 Profit rates according to innovation output, firm size and importance of
sources of finance as a barrier to innovation.
OPR ROTA
Innovators Non-innovators Innovators Non-innovators
All N % N % N % N %
Not important 136 4,5 132 4,2 139 10,1 131 10,6
Of medium importance 46 3,2 63 3,3 46 7,4 61 9,4
Very Important 82 3,1 103 2,2 81 7,9 101 7,0
1-19
Not important 17 4,6 61 4,9 17 13,8 60 11,9
Of medium importance 6 3,5 40 3,0 6 10,9 38 9,5
Very Important 23 5,4 64 2,1 23 12,0 62 6,9
20-49
Not important 16 3,9 24 5,0 17 10,1 24 10,2
Of medium importance 13 3,9 13 2,2 13 7,9 13 7,1
Very Important 17 1,6 22 2,6 17 2,8 22 7,4
50-99
Not important 28 3,7 20 2,9 29 11,6 20 7,6
Of medium importance 18 1,6 8 6,1 18 4,0 8 13,0
Very Important 12 1,9 7 -0,2 11 5,3 7 5,1
100-
Not important 75 4,7 27 3,5 76 9,8 27 10,3
Of medium importance 9 6,2 2 8,1 9 8,7 2 16,3
Very Important 30 2,7 10 2,6 30 7,3 10 9,8
The relationship between the importance of ‘sources of finance’ as a barrier and
profit rates can also be analysed by taking simple correlations, although the barrier
variable is not strictly continuous, but discrete. Some interesting patterns emerge
from the correlations between profit rates, cash flow and problems of funding
innovation activities (Table  3.9). Consistent with Table 3.8, the correlations are
negative, i.e. the lower the profit or cash flow, the more problems with finding funds.
Perhaps the most interesting result can be found in the north-east corner of Table 3.9,
where non-innovative firms with less than 50 employees show significant negative
correlations for each of the three profitability indicators. With larger non-innovators,
profit and problems of finance do not correlate. As for innovators, it is the groups of
smallest and largest enterprises in which profits and problems of finance correlate
most weakly.
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Table 3.9 Correlations of profit rate with ’lack of appropriate sources of finance’ as
a barrier to innovation. According to innovation output and size
Size Innovations No innovations
OPR ROTA Cash flow OPR ROTA Cash flow
All -.17 -.17 -.11 -.16 -.21 -.06
p-level (**) (**) ( ) (**) (**) ( )
N 264 266 268 298 293 300
1-19 -.01 -.07 -.16 -.17 -.25 -.20
p-level ( ) ( ) ( ) (*) (**) (*)
N 46 46 47 165 160 167
20-49 -.30 -.34 -.27 -.29 -.29 -.28
p-level (*) (*) ( ) (*) (*) (*)
N 46 46 47 59 59 59
50-99 -.28 -.24 -.13 -.10 -.24 .08
p-level (*) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N 58 58 59 35 35 35
100- -.14 -.15 -.12 -.07 -.05 .01
p-level ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N 114 115 115 39 39 39
** = p<.01; * = .01<=p<.05
One way to interpret the results above is to assume that profit rates indicate the
internal financial capabilities of firms to introduce innovations, and reported
financial problems indicate the motivation to do so. According to this interpretation,
negative correlations for small non-innovating firms may indicate that internal
financial capabilities have been a relevant factor in preventing innovation activities.
As far as large enterprises are concerned, profit rate or cash flow does not seem to
have an impact on the financing of innovation. Perhaps the most curious result in
Table 3.9 (as can be inferred from Table 3.8, also) is the correlations close to zero for
small innovating enterprises. Although 51 per cent of them reported ‘sources of
finance’ as an important barrier, this does not correlate with the profit rate and only
weakly with cash flow. One possible explanation is that innovation for the relatively
low proportion of small enterprises that introduce innovations in the first place is so
crucial that profit rate does not play a decisive role. What matters is the expected
future growth of sales. Also, a considerable proportion of them may be newcomers,
in which case their products are by definition innovations and subsequently there is
no relation to the profit rate.
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4. How can we account for differences among
innovators?
So far the focus has been on differences between innovators and non-innovators. In
this chapter we go on to take a closer look at innovators alone, to investigate whether
differences in innovation activity are related to profitability and salesgrowth in firms.
In the first section we compare developments in profits for product- and process
innovators. At the outset we would expect that product innovations are more risky,
but with greater potential if successful. Process innovations, on the other hand, are
more often aimed at cost reductions or more efficient production in already existing
lines of production; hence the risk may be smaller, but so may the potential benefit.
The second section applies the same analysis to sales growth as the performance
indicator. Next we apply an indicator from the innovation survey where firms were
asked to state the share of total sales consisting of totally new or changed products
over the preceding three year period. Does this measure of innovativeness, which
essentially measures the degree of successful innovation, also show up in profits and
salesgrowth? Lastly, we look for effects of the amount of innovation inputs,
measured relative to the size of firms, on profitability and salesgrowth. Are those
firms with large innovation inputs also the more profitable ones?
4.1 Development in profit rates for product- and process innovators
For many firms, product- and process innovation goes hand in hand; a new product
may require a new or modified process, and a new or modified process may result in
changes to product characteristics. There is a difference, however, between changing
or renewing product characteristics, and improving the production process. Changing
the production process requires an already existing production, which one wants to
improve. Essentially, this can be viewed as a kind of cost reducing operation, where
the market for the product being produced is already known. Thus in many cases the
risk of such innovation can be considered to be moderate. One can argue that this in
many cases might be a defensive action; the triggering experience might be pressures
on profit levels by competing firms. Product innovation, on the other hand, includes
presenting a new or changed product to the market. This might be a defensive action
too, but can also be viewed as an offensive move with future opportunities. In such a
situation there might be uncertainties about whether the new or improved product
will be accepted. The risk increases, of course, according to the degree of “newness”
- which is true of both product- and process innovations.
What would this imply for the observed profit rates or development of sales, if these
indicators really reflect what is happening? If it is true that risks are generally greater
for product innovation than for process innovation, we would expect greater diversity
in the results of product innovators, as some of them will fail due to the higher risks
involved. Among process innovators, if risk is generally lower, we would expect to
find less variation. Secondly, we would expect the potential profit of successful firms
to be greater for product innovators, whilst also showing a longer lag in the
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realisation of the profits. It is not necessarily possible to track this in the data,
however, as successful and unsuccessful innovations are mixed. This problem is to a
certain degree modified in Section 4.3 below, when we introduce the share of new or
changed products into the discussion. In a sense, this indicator “isolates” the
successful innovations, and thus give us an opportunity to look for a relationship
between innovation success and success in terms of profits or growth in sales.
In the CIS survey, firms were asked if they had introduced any new or changed
products or processes during the past 3 year period (1990-1992). Just over half the
innovative firms included in our panel reported both product- and process
innovations (146 firms). 42 firms, or 15 %, reported product innovation alone, and
the remaining 88 firms (32 %) reported process innovation alone. Below we compare
how the performance of these three groups on our indicators of profit and
development in sales.
Figure 4.1. Median operating profit 1991-1994 by type of innovation. Short panel.
N=276.
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The level of operating profit is not substantially different for product and process
innovators and those involved in both types of innovation. As can be seen from
Figure 4.1, the difference - at its greatest – lies around 1 percentage point. It seems
that growth in profit rates starts somewhat later among product innovators, but that
they increase more rapidly once started, compared to process innovators. The minor
variations observed here, however, cannot be said to show significant differences.
This has also been confirmed by a formal test for each individual year.18
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 Testing for significant differences between groups of firms in this chapter is based on ANOVA
(analysis of variance). The method investigates whether the total variance in observed values (that is,
the squared deviance from the grand total) can be better explained by introducing the classes or groups
under study, taking into consideration the number of observations and the degrees of freedom (number
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Even if the median profit rates do not differ, variance within the groups of product-
process innovators may be hidden by this measure of central tendency. In Table 4.1
below we present the 1st and 3rd quartiles (Q1 and Q3), the 1st and 9th  percentiles and
their differences. As we can see, variation between the groups is very small for all
the years considered. A formal test also reveals that there are no significant
differences in mean deviation from the group medians in any of the years.19 Thus we
must conclude that there are no differences in risk attached to process and product
innovation as hypothesised above, the way product-process innovation is recorded
here and revealed in profit rates.
Table 4.1. Operating profit 1991-1994 according to product or process innovation.
Measures of variance. Short panel.
N Median Q3 Q1 Q3-Q1 P9 P1 P9-P1
OPR91 Product only 42 4,3 7,3 0,6 6,8 9,4 -2,5 11,9
Both 146 4,0 6,6 1,1 5,5 10,0 -3,1 13,1
Process only 88 4,0 8,8 1,6 7,2 13,5 -0,6 14,1
OPR92 Product only 42 4,0 7,3 1,4 5,9 9,9 -2,7 12,6
Both 146 4,3 7,7 2,0 5,7 10,3 -1,2 11,5
Process only 88 5,2 8,8 5,5 6,3 12,2 0,1 12,3
OPR93 Product only 42 5,0 7,9 1,7 6,2 9,9 -1,7 11,6
Both 146 4,4 8,0 1,8 6,2 10,4 -1,4 11,8
Process only 88 4,7 8,6 2,2 6,3 12,5 -0,1 12,6
OPR94 Product only 42 5,3 8,4 3,1 5,3 11,6 1,8 13,4
Both 146 4,4 7,7 1,9 5,8 12,6 -2,6 15,2
Process only 88 5,3 9,5 2,0 7,4 14,7 -1,1 15,8
Looking at our second profit indicator, return on total assets, we basically find the
same pattern as found for operating profit (Figure 4.2 below). None of the
differences between groups are statistically significant20, but in firms where process
innovation is involved the profit rate seems to level off over time, whereas there is a
weak but persistent growth over time among the product innovators. This is in line
with the hypothesis put forward above, namely that product innovation is in a sense
an offensive action, while process innovation is more often of a defensive nature.
Thus product innovators have the opportunity to increase market shares and profits,
while process innovators to a larger extent defend their position and are thus fighting
to maintain existing levels of profit. One must note, however, that the evidence is
weak, possibly because the time span covered is too short to reveal any “final”
outcome. Obviously, longer time series and more research is needed on this topic.
                                                                                                                                         
of categories). The level of significance is set to 95%, that is, we accept that there is a 5 % likeliness
that the observed differences might come about by chance.
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 Tested by ANOVA, see footnote 18.
20
 Tested by ANOVA, see footnote 18.
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Figure 4.2. Return on total assets 1991-1994 by type of innovation. Short panel.
N=276.
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A possible source of error when comparing profits among process and product
innovators is the mix of firms of different size or different industry within groups. To
control for this, we have broken down the material according to size and industry.
Five size classes are used, and profit levels are compared for product and process
innovators within the classes. Results are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below. In
general, no clear picture emerges from these tables. There are of course differences
in profit levels among firms of different sizes, but in the vast majority of cases,
differences among process and product innovators are not significant at the usual 5-
percent level, even within size classes.21 The same is true when controlling for
industry (Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4); profit levels do vary between industries,
but these variations cannot be better explained when introducing the product-process
innovation distinction. We must therefore conclude that the distinction between
product and process innovators does not add to explaining variation in profit levels,
and that differences either in size of firm or in industry do not change this picture.
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 Tested by ANOVA, see footnote 18.
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Table 4.2. Product-process innovators. Median operating profit 1991-94 (short
panel) by size class.
Size class Year Product
innovators
Product and process
innovators
Process innovators
1-19 1991 6,1 3,9 3,1
1992 3,4 2,1 8,3
1993 4,4 4,4 3,3
1994 5,6 4,5 5,0
20-49 1991 3,2 3,0 1,9
1992 5,4 4,0 3,6
1993 6,2 3,7 4,5
1994 2,8 4,6 4,1
50-99 1991 2,8 3,5 4,0
1992 5,9 3,9 5,2
1993 2,8 6,2 4,5
1994 6,4 4,8 4,6
100-199 1991 2,6 4,4 4,9
1992 2,9 5,3 7,1
1993 4,9 4,1 7,1
1994 6,1 3,3 8,2
200 + 1991 4,9 4,2 4,7
1992 4,9 4,7 3,9
1993 5,7 4,1 3,2
1994 4,6 5,2 5,2
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Table 4.3. Product-process innovators. Median ROTA 1991-94 (short panel) by size
class.
Size class Year Product
innovators
Product and process
innovators
Process innovators
1-19 1991 16,7 11,2 10,7
1992 9,2 6,1 13,8
1993 14,4 10,6 10,8
1994 16,6 13,2 11,4
20-49 1991 7,4 7,9 6,7
1992 16,8 9,7 9,8
1993 15,4 7,5 11,5
1994 6,6 8,9 5,5
50-99 1991 5,3 7,8 9,8
1992 11,3 9,5 11,2
1993 10,6 11,9 9,6
1994 12,4 8,3 9,2
100-199 1991 8,5 9,4 13,4
1992 8,0 10,7 13,4
1993 9,1 7,9 14,7
1994 11,2 6,8 12,5
200 + 1991 6,6 8,0 12,6
1992 10,2 9,1 9,6
1993 10,0 7,8 9,8
1994 7,8 9,2 10,9
Part of the problem with explaining differences in profit rates between product- and
process innovators relates to the timing of obtained results. The time it takes for
profits to react to innovative action may differ for product and process innovators, in
different industries and for firms of varying size. To investigate this, we have simply
computed an average profit level over the four year period under study, as an
unweighted average of each firm’s profit-to-sales ratio. This measure thus indicates
the level of profitability independent of when in the four year period it is earned.
Looking at operating profits first (Figure 4.3), we find that the picture is rather fuzzy.
However, it seems that there is a rather sharp increase in profit levels for process
innovators when firm size increases, up to size class 100-199 employees. Also, when
using return on total assets as the profit indicator, process innovators seem to have
higher profit levels the larger the firm, but again with an exception for the smallest
and largest firms (Figure 4.4). Using this indicator, we also find a persistent drop in
profit level for product innovators as firm size increases. It is hard to know how to
interpret this. One possibility could be that there is greater chance to succeed with
product innovation, rather than process innovation, if you are small - and vice versa
for bigger companies.
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Figure 4.3. Operating profit. Unweighted average 1991-1994 by type of innovation.
Short panel. N=276.
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Figure 4.4. Return on total assets. Unweighted average 1991-1994 by type of
innovation. Short panel. N=276.
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A final topic to be considered when looking at profits for product and process
innovators concerns the persistence of profits over time. A significant change in
profit level indicates that firms’ performances have changed - for better or worse. A
persistent level, on the other hand, could be an indication of the ability to cope with
changing environments, as argued in Chapter 3. In Table 4.4 we have computed
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simple correlations of profit level for the first year and the following years to check
this. It appears that the level is somewhat more persistent amongst innovators
compared to non-innovators, in particular due to the development in the groups of
process innovators. The differences are not large, however.
Perhaps the most striking result is the lack of persistence of profits amongst product
only innovators. This could be an indication of higher risks for product innovation
compared to process innovation, as discussed above. Single firms may experience
significant changes to profits due to the success or failure of innovation, thus leading
to a lack of correlation of profit level for the first and subsequent years. If failing and
succeeding firms are more or less equally distributed within the group of product
innovators (and size classes), this may explain why we have not discovered this type
of relationship in the preceding analysis. Also, taking seriously the argument that
innovative capacity makes firms able to cope with changing environments, this
seems to be more appropriate for process innovation than for product innovation.
Let us add a warning that the number of observations is rather limited in this
analysis, particularly for product only innovators. In addition, the arguments for a
relationship between persistence of profits and innovative risk is a rather complicated
one that needs further discussion. Therefore the conclusions should be treated as
suggestions for further research, rather than the final word on these topics.
Table 4.4. Persistence of profits. Correlations of operating profit and return on total
assets 1991 with operating profits and return on total assets 1992-1994.
Short panel.
N 1992 1993 1994
OPR
All 640 .50** .49** .39**
Non-innovators 364 .56** .41** .33**
Product only innovators 42 .41** .30 .21
Product and process innovators 146 .35** .58** .52**
Process only innovators 88 .66** .60** .38**
ROTA
All 640 .38** .25** .18**
Non-innovators 364 .35** .16** .18**
Product only innovators 42 .47** .29 -.07
Product and process innovators 146 .32** .40** .26**
Process only innovators 88 .61** .56** .19
** p<.01; *.01<= p <= .05
4.2 Development in sales for product and process innovators
So far in this chapter, profit has been treated as the sole objective of firms. Profit
may indeed be the final goal, but in the interim, increasing market shares or
expanding the market itself may be necessary. The short term, therefore, may see a
trade off between profits and market share - via, for example, temporarily lowered
prices. Small or newly founded firms in particular may find such trade offs
necessary, in order to achieve at least the minimum market size needed for efficient
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operations. As market share is not available to us as a variable, we apply the size of
total sales as a proxy – on the grounds that increasing sales, in most cases, results
from expanding market shares or the market itself.
Development of sales for all firms independent of size is shown in Figure 4.5 below.
Sales has been converted into an index set to 100 in the first year under study,
namely 1991. The general picture is one of increasing sales over time amongst
innovators. Also for non-innovators sales grow the first year, in fact even more than
for innovators, but over time non-innovators experience a decline, and innovators
seem to grow more quickly. The fastest growing innovators are product only
innovators - perhaps due to the more offensive nature of product innovation as
discussed above.
Figure 4.5. Development in sales 1991-1994 by type of innovation. Index 1991=100.
N=640.
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In Figures 4.6-4.10 below, sales development is shown according to firm size. The
general picture of greater growth for innovators than for non-innovators is
maintained throughout the size classes - and product innovators make up the
strongest growing group in all size classes. There are some differences, however.
First of all, smaller firms have significantly higher relative growth than larger ones,
independent of whether they are product innovators, process innovators or non-
innovators. In absolute numbers, of course, growth is greatest for the larger
companies, as the bases from which they grow are larger. We will nevertheless
interpret the results as a difference in the priorities given to salesgrowth versus
profits between smaller and larger companies: smaller companies seem to put more
emphasis on growth than larger ones.
Another interesting feature that emerges when controlling for size classes, is that the
decline in sales in the second half of the period for non-innovators is entirely due to
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the development of larger firms (with 200 employees or more). In the other size
classes non-innovators do experience a slower growth than innovators, but we do not
find decline as with the larger companies. It is, however, difficult to interpret this
without further investigation of this group of non-innovating large companies. It
could be suggested that these are companies in traditional industries with economies
of scale explaining their size, operating in international markets highly affected by
cyclical developments. But that is for future analysis to decide.
Figure 4.6. Small firms (1-19). Development in sales 1991-1994 by type of
innovation. Index 1991=100. N=268.
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Figure 4.7. Medium sized firms (20-49). Development in sales 1991-1994 by type of
innovation. Index 1991=100. N=111.
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Figure 4.8. Medium sized firms (50-99). Development in sales 1991-1994 for by type
of innovation. Index 1991=100. N=90.
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Figure 4.9. Large firms (100-199). Development in sales 1991-1994 for by type of
innovation. Index 1991=100. N=89.
90.0
95.0
100.0
105.0
110.0
115.0
1991 1992 1993 1994
Year
Sa
le
sg
ro
w
th
, i
nd
ex
 1
99
1=
10
0
Non-innovators
Product only innovators
Product and process innovators
Process only innovators
Large firms (100-199 employees)
Figure 4.10. Large firms (200+). Development in sales 1991-1994 for by type of
innovation. Index 1991=100. N=82.
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Having investigated the differences amongst product and process innovators at
length above, we do not seem to find any strong evidence that this distinction is of
significant importance for developments in profit levels. Profit rates among
innovators are seen to grow slowly over time for the period under study, perhaps
somewhat more for product innovators than process innovators, but the differences
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are not statistically significant. The analysis of persistence of profits suggested the
conclusion that there is a somewhat greater degree of uncertainty involved with
product innovation compared to process innovation, as profit rates are not correlated
over time to the same degree. This suggestion requires further research, however.
When looking at developments in sales, we see that innovative firms grow more than
non-innovative ones. In particular, non-innovative large companies have a negative
development in sales in the second half of the period under study. Smaller firms are
in general seen to grow more in relative terms than larger ones. We conclude our
discussion with the suggestion that this is probably due to the priority given to
growth in smaller firms, in many cases at the expense of profits in the short term.
4.3 How important are new products for profits?
The CIS approach to measuring the results of product innovation was to ask firms
how much of their total sales in 1992 consisted of products that were completely new
or significantly improved over the period 1990-92. How does this indicator relate to
economic results as recorded in the accounts?
At the outset we would expect there to be a positive relationship, with higher profits
among firms reporting a larger share of new products. However, there are many
factors that might disturb such a relationship. First of all, profit rates vary according
to the industry the firms belong to. So too does the need and opportunity to innovate;
in industries with rapid technological change firms have to innovate frequently in
order to keep up with the competition. This might in fact contribute to lowering
profits, as there is a cost side to innovative activity drawing upon available funds.
The opposite might happen in industries with a slower pace of change; if market
positions are stable and well defined, profits may be high even if the industry is not
particularly innovative in terms of large shares of new products in sales. Another
point relates to the timing of results to show up in profits; this problem affects the
analysis here in the same way as in the other parts of the report.
Our first approach - to look for a relationship between profits and new product sales,
is simply to see whether the numbers are correlated using Pearson’s r. This method
looks at correlations on a firm-by-firm basis. Results are reported in Table 4.5 below,
broken down by industry. As can be seen, we generally do not find any significant
correlations, with only a few exceptions - most noticeable in the food and textile
industries. The significant coefficients are positive however, as expected, except for
the basic metals industry. A similar analysis controlling for size hardly gives any
significant coefficients at all. We must conclude, therefore, that there does not exist
any general and simple relationship between the share of new products in sales and
profit rates in subsequent years when profits are measured as they are here, and
without bringing in additional explanatory variables. Unfortunately, the number of
observations in the data set does not allow us to control for size and industry
simultaneously.
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Table 4.5. Correlations of new products share of sales 1992 with OPR and ROTA
1991-1994 by industry (short panel). Not significant correlations reported as
0.
INDUSTRY OPR91 OPR92 OPR93 OPR94 ROTA91 ROTA92 ROTA93 ROTA94
All industries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Food, beverages and tobacco 0 0 0,45** 0,37* 0 0 0,35* 0
Textiles, wearing apparel, fur and leather 0 0 0,60* 0,85** 0 0 0,58* 0,82**
Wood products, pulp and paper 0 0 0,54** 0 0 0 0,54** 0
Publishing and printing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mineral products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,58* 0
Basic metals, metal products 0 -0,38* 0 0 0 -0,40* 0 0
Machinery and equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electrical and optical equipment, incl. IT 0 0,45* 0 0 0 0,41* 0 0
Transport equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Furniture, recycling 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
** p<.01; *.01<= p <= .05
Even if there is no relationship at firm level, this might be due to additional factors
influencing performance within the individual firm. Therefore it may still be possible
to identify differences between classes of firms dependent on their level of new
product sales. We have constructed such classes for firms with no new products in
their sales, firms with a low share (1-25 %) and firms with a high share (more than
25 %) of new products in their sales. The borderline between the high and low
categories are somewhat arbitrary, reflecting that 25 % is a rather high share of new
or changed products, but on the other hand the number of firms in each group should
not be too different. In the sample, 104 (60 %) firms fall within the high category and
68 (40 %) in the low category. 104 firms have no new products. Results are reported
in Figures 4.11-4.13 below, including salesgrowth as an additional result indicator.
The first thing we notice is that the profit level among those firms with a high share
of new products in sales is always higher than profits for firms with a low share of
new products in sales. The same applies to the development in sales. What upsets the
picture somewhat, however, is the group of firms with no new products. In general,
they seem to perform at the same level as the most innovative firms. This may be a
reasonable result, since most of these firms (80%) are process only innovators. Thus
they may be successful innovators even if this does not show up in the sales of new
products.
A statistical test of differences between the groups in Figures 4.11-4.13 reveals that
they are in most cases not significant at the 5 % level.22 This is, however, to a large
extent due to the inclusion of the group with no new products in sales. Also, this test
for significance is influenced by where the borderline between the high and low
group is drawn. Since we can see a persistently higher performance among those
with a high share of new products in sales than among those with a low share, we
interpret this to mean that successful innovation - in terms of a larger share of new
products in sales - have a positive effect on profits and salesgrowth. This result
holds, however, for the average performance of firms, and not necessarily for the
                                                
22
 Tested by ANOVA, see footnote 18.
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single firm, as demonstrated in the correlation analysis above. This can be paralleled
with the management of a portfolio of innovation projects, where it is possible to
obtain a positive outcome from the total portfolio, but not necessarily for each single
project. This is of course due to the risk involved, and demonstrates the need to be
large enough to operate a whole portfolio of projects to increase the possibility for a
positive outcome. This is generally possible for larger firms and society as a whole,
but of course more difficult for smaller firms. Argued this way, the results can be
seen as a demonstration of a rationale for public involvement in supporting, and thus
managing, a portfolio of innovation projects.
Figure 4.11. Median operating profit by high (more than 25 %), low (1-25 %) and no
(0 %) new products in sales. Short panel. Innovative firms. N=269.
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Figure 4.12. Median return on total assets by high (more than 25 %), low (1-25 %)
and no (0 %) new products in sales. Short panel. Innovative firms. N=270.
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Figure 4.13. Salesgrowth (index, 1991=100) by high (more than 25 %), low (1-25 %)
and no (0 %) new products in sales. Short panel. Innovative firms. N=276.
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4.4 To what extent are innovation inputs reflected in profits?
So far we have established a relationship between profits or salesgrowth and the
degree of innovativeness - measured by share of new products in sales and evaluated
for classes of innovative companies. Is there a relationship also with innovation
inputs, measured by innovation costs? Again we would at the outset expect such a
relationship to be positive, but with the usual factors disturbing the relationship;
industry differences, the differences in time lag of results, the riskiness and resulting
variance in results among firms, and other factors not included in the analysis. In
particular it is a problem that we have innovation costs data for one year only; the
ideal would have been the stock of knowledge built up over time, or long-term
average values.
Our first approach is the same as in the last section, looking at relations of inputs and
profits at firm level using correlation analysis (Pearsons r). All measures used are
relative to sales, i.e. innovation costs as a percentage of total sales and profit rates
(relative to sales). It turns out that such a relationship at firm level is hard to establish
with a reasonable degree of statistical significance, even when controlling for
industry, size class or the product-process distinction. Even if most of the significant
coefficients are positive, as expected, they are in general few, with small coefficients
and in some cases even negative. Results are reported in Appendix Tables A5  and
A6.
As in the former analysis, we then approach the problem by constructing classes of
firms, depending upon how much they spend on innovation inputs relative to their
sales (innovation costs intensity). The rationale for doing this is that even if there is
no clear and identifiable relationship at firm level, there may still be differences
among the groups of firms investing high or low shares of sales in innovations. We
have constructed three classes, with innovation intensities less than 1 including 0
(N=47), 1-4 (N=115) and 4 or above (N=114). These classes are somewhat arbitrary,
and the choice of borderlines will affect whether differences are significant. The
classes do, however, apply the same borderlines as used by the OECD to classify
low, medium and high tech industries based on R&D expenses.
We find no clear difference when comparing the two classes investing most heavily
in innovation (see Figures 4.14 and 4.15). Over time the medium class seems to
improve its performance relative to the high class, but this difference is not
statistically significant.23 The class of firms with innovation intensity less than 1, on
the other hand, performs more weakly than the others for all the years and for both of
our two profits measures. These differences are in most cases statistically significant.
It seems, then, that profits on average are higher in firms with an innovation intensity
above 1 than in firms  with an innovation intensity below 1. Ideally, this result should
have been controlled also for industry, as the intensity of innovative activity clearly
varies between industries. This is not possible, however, as the number of
observations is too limited. In fact, all industries are represented in this group of low
innovation intensity, but two industries account for around 20 % of the observations
each: food, beverages and tobacco, and transport equipment.
                                                
23
 Tested by ANOVA, see footnote 18.
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If we look at a different sample, and use the long panel data set of large companies
from 1990 to 1994, we basically get the same results as for the short panel (Figures
4.16 and 4.17 below). This even applies to the 1990 observation year, two years
before the innovative input recorded in this survey. This strengthens our confidence
in the findings.
Figure 4.14 Operating profits 1991-94 (short panel) by innovation intensity. N=269.
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Figure 4.15. Return on total assets 1991-94 (short panel) by innovation intensity.
N=270.
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Figure 4.16. Operating profits 1990-94 (long panel) by innovation intensity. N=107.
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Figure 4.17. Return on total assets 1990-94 (long panel) by innovation intensity.
N=106.
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The last indicator of performance applied in this study is development in sales. Using
the same categories for high, medium and low innovation intensities as above,
50 STEP rapport / report R-01/1997
developments in sales are compared for the classes over the period 1990/91 - 1994.
As can be seen from Figures 4.18 and 4.19 below, the differences between classes
are relatively moderate. It is none the less striking how firms with the highest
innovation investments seem to outperform the others in both 1993 and 1994. This
result holds for both the short panel involving all firms, and the one-year longer
panel of large firms. Thus again it appears that innovative firms take out part of the
revenue in increasing market shares. Of course, over time this will, most likely, also
result in higher profit rates.
Figure 4.18. Salesgrowth 1991-1994 (index 1991=100), short panel, by innovation
intensity (N=276)
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Figure 4.19. Salesgrowth (index 1990=100) 1990-1994, long panel, by innovation
intensity (N=108)
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5. Concluding remarks
Does it pay off to be innovative? The question is asked over and again by policy
makers as well as in private businesses. The answer is not an unambiguous “yes”
according to our analysis, but differences do indeed exist. They depend upon who
you are; what business you are in and what you are trying to accomplish. This is by
and large in accordance with established knowledge in the field, and with our own
expectations to the work at the outset. However, we are now able to apply statistical
testing to some of the propositions, work that will continue in future efforts both to
utilise existing data better and to add new data to the analysis.
For some of the problems considered, the time span covered may be too short. Our
data cover innovation expenses recorded for the year 1992 and new products
introduced 1990-92, merged with accounting data for the 5-(4)-year period 1990(91)-
1994. In all, 640 firms are included in the final matched panel under study.
The number of observations in the data material does not allow us to control for all
the relevant variables simultaneously. This problem is particularly strongly felt for
analysts studying a small economy like the Norwegian, where the universe of firms
under study is limited. Therefore, the particular findings referred to below should not
be taken as causal relationships, as underlying variables not included in the particular
analysis may be correlated to the variables under study and disturb the picture. For
example, there seem to be significant differences between firms of different size, and
between firms belonging to different industries. At the same time, the distribution on
firm size varies between industries. It is hard to tell which of the two variables is the
most important, since they cannot both be included in the same analysis. It is
nevertheless interesting and important to establish that such differences do exist,
even if we have to leave to future analysis to establish the exact causal relationships.
Our findings are that there are no major and clear-cut differences between innovators
and non-innovators, product and process innovators unless additional factors are
taken into account; the relationships depend upon factors like firms size, industry,
innovative strategy and innovative inputs. Even within industries there are large
variations. Thus, for some of the groups of firms we have studied, there do indeed
exist differences between firms, both in terms of profit rates and, in particular, in
terms of sales growth.
We have investigated whether there are any systematic differences in profit rates and
sales-growth between firms of different kinds. The two measures of profitability
applied - operating profits and return on total assets - are generally highly correlated,
and in most of the analysis they show more or less the same pattern between groups.
We therefore refer here to profitability without specifying which measure it refers to.
In addition the high correlation strengthens our confidence in the findings.
For Norwegian industry as a whole there are no significant differences in
profitability between innovators and non-innovators. This is of course due to the fact
that we have a mix of companies from different industries and of different sizes.
Controlling for industry reveals that in some industries, namely printing and
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publishing, chemicals, rubber and plastics, innovators earn a higher profit, whereas in
wood products, pulp and paper, non-innovators do better in terms of profit rates. In
other industries there is a change over time in which of the two groups does the best.
A breakdown by size shows that among large companies (more than 50 employees)
innovators do better than non-innovators, a difference that is persistent over time.
This is a confirmation that innovation seems to have a positive effect on profitability.
For smaller firms, however, there is no clear picture. As the results for smaller
companies are more vulnerable to problems stemming from panel construction (there
are more drop-outs among the smaller companies), one can argue that the analysis of
the larger companies is more reliable. In particular for the smaller firms it is therefore
preferable to try to bring into the analysis what happens to the drop-out firms.
Another effect that can be observed among the larger companies, and not the smaller
ones, is that profits are more persistent over time among innovators than among non-
innovators. This seems to support the argument that innovators are less vulnerable to
changes in the business environment than non-innovators.
Looking next at developments in sales, we again find a difference in the performance
of small and large companies. Among the smaller ones, innovators grow faster than
non-innovators. We interpret this as an indication of success, and as a priority given
to expanding the scale of operation in smaller companies at the cost of (maybe
temporarily) lowered profit rates. Among larger companies sales develop differently:
in the first years non-innovators grow faster than innovators, but the growth levels
off and the innovators catch up during the last years we have observed (1994).
The innovation survey included questions on factors hampering innovation - among
them problems of finance. For the firms, retained profits is an important source of
finance for innovation, as credit is hard to get for risky projects. Therefore one would
expect there to be a negative correlation between reported problems of finance and
profit rate. We do find such a correlation, but not for the larger companies. It is likely
that many of the larger companies are in command of such resources that financing
innovation is less of a problem than for the smaller ones. Among small and medium
sized companies, one could say that where profitability is low, innovation is
hampered by lack of appropriate finance that restricts innovative companies from
doing more, and keeps non-innovative companies from doing anything at all. This is
indeed an argument for a closer assessment - or maybe reassessment - of how public
support for innovation is split between large and small companies - without drawing
any firm conclusions based solely on this result.
Looking in more detail at the performance of the innovators, we initially made a
distinction between firms involved with product innovation only, those in process
innovation only, and firms involved with both kinds of innovation. In general, this
distinction does not help to explain differences in profitability among firms. This is
true even when controlling for size classes and industry. Nor are there any
differences in variance in profitability, which we interpret to mean that the riskiness
of product and process innovation is not significantly different. There is, however, a
lack of persistence of profits among the product only innovators, which might
indicate that the risk involved is somewhat higher than for process innovation. This
result is, however, uncertain and requires further research. Taking the problem of
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timing of results into consideration, we constructed a measure of average profits for
the whole time period under study. The picture still remains somewhat fuzzy, but
there is an indication that smaller companies seem to do better when involved with
product innovation, whereas larger ones do better when involved with process
innovation.
Using sales-growth as the performance indicator, we find clearer differences.
Innovators grow faster than non-innovators, and the difference increases over time.
In particular, firms involved in product innovation grow faster, and growth is
generally faster among small innovators than larger ones.
The output-indicator introduced in the innovation survey on share of sales stemming
from new or changed products is interesting in itself, but does it entail increased
profits or higher sales for the firms? On a firm-to-firm basis we are not able to
establish such a relationship; a simple correlation of shares of new products with
profit rates hardly show any statistically significant relations at all. This is even true
when controlling for industry or size classes. Now, this does not necessarily mean
that there is no relationship. As argued in section 4.3 and elsewhere, the riskiness of
innovation necessarily brings with it some failures that will disturb the relationship
between innovativeness and profitability at the level of single firms. If, on the other
hand, we consider groups of firms as representing portfolios of innovative
investments, we might be able to observe positive outcomes in each portfolio. Of
course, the portfolios constructed here are “synthetic”, in the sense that they do not
reflect real risk sharing among the firms. From the viewpoint of society as a whole, it
may nevertheless bring gains from innovation, even if there are losses to some of the
individual firms. The results, of course, are dependent upon how the groups, or
“synthetic portfolios” are constructed. We have simply grouped firms according to
whether the share of new products in sales is “high” (more than 25 %), “low” (1-25
%) or none at all. Results show a higher profit rate among firms with a “high” share
of new products in sales, compared to those with a low share. The same is true for
the sales-growth variable. In other words, being innovative in this sense seems to
show up also in economic results, but only evaluated for groups, or “portfolios”, of
innovations. On the other hand, firms with no new products in sales have equally
high profits and sales-growth as the highly innovative in terms of new products. This
group, however, mainly consists of firms involved with process-only innovation. In
this analysis  they seem to perform as well as the most innovative product innovators.
Applying the same kind of logic concerning “portfolios” of innovative investments,
we finally looked into the relationship between innovative investments and economic
performance. Firms are grouped into three categories, according to the level of
innovation cost intensity (percentage of total innovation costs of total sales). The
groups applied are “high” (4 % or more), “medium” (1-3,99%) and “low” (0-1 %).
Results show statistically significantly lower profit rates for the low-intensity group,
whereas for the two remaining groups it is not possible to distinguish between them.
For the sales-growth indicator there are only minor differences, except that the high-
intensity category grow faster from 1992 onwards.
Before leaving this discussion, let us remind the reader of some of the problems
encountered in time series analysis involving panel construction. Firms are born and
closed down all the time, they are restructured through take-overs and split-offs. This
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is part of ordinary business operation, and may be related to innovative strategy,
among other things. Including such activity in the analysis is, however, extremely
difficult. Firms where this has taken place to any significant degree have been left
out of the panel, since we are unable to follow the same units over time. This
obviously blurs the picture: some of the closedowns should be counted as losses -
possibly due to failed innovation - and some of them as successes, as they may be
taken over by other companies to get access to their technology. The activity as such
may therefore continue to exist and prosper, but we are unable to follow the unit. The
analysis of dropout firms do indicate that such phenomena exist: the  48 firms that
ceased to exist (bankruptcy or other kinds of closing down) have a particularly low
proportion of innovators: 21 %. Firms with a new identity code, that is firms coded
as a part of another firm, have a much higher share of innovators: 43 %. In addition
to these, 107 firms dropped out of the panel due to large increases or decreases in
sales - indicating that split-offs or take-overs have taken place. These have a quite
substantial share of innovators (36 %) and in particular low profitability. In all,
construction of the panel resulted in a loss of 22 % of the firms. These are clearly
different from those remaining in the panel. We therefore suggest to follow up with a
more detailed study of the drop-outs. We will emphasise, however, that the drop-outs
include both possible gains and losses due to innovation, so the net effect of leaving
them out could be both positive and negative.
Let us emphasise too, that a longer panel in terms of years covered is necessary to
address some of the questions related to innovation, profitability and growth. Our
first concern relates to the time it takes for results to come about, which requires
more years of accounting data. There is, however, a drawback to consider when
doing this; the panel construction becomes even more difficult and the number of
drop-outs will increase.
The second concern relates to trying to explain the incentives for firms to involve
themselves with innovation. If part of the answer to this question is to be found in the
accounts, one needs information going further back in time than that available to us
in this round.
The most important problem, however, concerns information on the innovative
activity itself. So far, we only have information on innovative activity undertaken at
one single point in time. Strictly speaking we don’t know whether this is an
indication of an activity with some degree of permanence  or if it is more occasional,
even though we expect it to be rather permanent, in particular for larger firms. To
solve this problem we must await future innovation surveys. A matter to consider in
this respect is whether one should try to re-establish the original sample of firms - to
facilitate panel analysis - or draw a completely new sample for reasons of
representativeness.
Finally, in our analysis we have shown that it is possible to establish a relationship
between innovative activity and economic performance as recorded in accounting
data. It is our belief that future analysis using this methodology will bring even more
insight into the question of the profitability of innovative activity than we have been
able to in this round. Efforts to improve data quality and expand the time series is
therefore worth while.
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Appendix A: Additional tables
Table A.1. Operating profit ratio (OPR) according to innovation activities, panel
1991-94. Product or process innovations, OPR between -30 - 30 % each year
(data for figures 3.1 and 3.5)
Industry,
Nace
YEAR Inno-
vations
Firms Profit,
mean
Profit,
std
25%
quartile
Profit,
median
75%
quartile
Range of
profit
15-37 91 No 361 3.5 6.2 0.9 3.6 6.6 46.5
15-37 91 Yes 269 4.1 5.8 1.2 4.0 7.3 47.3
15-37 92 No 361 3.7 6.1 1.3 3.9 6.2 53.7
15-37 92 Yes 269 4.6 5.6 2.0 4.4 7.9 56.1
15-37 93 No 361 4.8 5.9 1.5 4.4 7.9 49.6
15-37 93 Yes 269 4.9 5.8 2.1 4.5 8.0 55.7
15-37 94 No 361 4.9 6.8 1.7 4.8 8.4 53.7
15-37 94 Yes 269 5.3 6.2 2.3 4.9 8.4 47.2
15-16 91 No 57 3.6 5.9 0.8 3.3 7.5 32.5
15-16 91 Yes 45 2.6 4.2 1.3 3.1 5.2 20.3
15-16 92 No 57 3.9 4.7 0.7 3.7 5.6 23.6
15-16 92 Yes 45 4.4 3.8 2.1 3.9 6.8 16.1
15-16 93 No 57 5.4 3.8 2.6 5.0 7.0 16.8
15-16 93 Yes 45 4.3 4.1 1.9 4.3 7.2 21.8
15-16 94 No 57 4.3 5.1 1.5 3.7 7.4 30.0
15-16 94 Yes 45 3.3 4.9 1.5 3.3 6.7 27.5
17-19 91 No 22 5.6 6.2 0.9 6.3 9.9 25.5
17-19 91 Yes 12 5.0 3.7 1.7 5.5 7.4 12.6
17-19 92 No 22 4.3 4.7 2.3 3.9 6.2 21.7
17-19 92 Yes 12 4.1 4.3 1.1 4.9 7.1 13.3
17-19 93 No 22 5.1 5.7 3.0 5.7 8.7 25.4
17-19 93 Yes 12 4.4 4.1 1.9 4.0 7.9 13.7
17-19 94 No 22 5.3 7.5 2.2 4.9 8.0 35.9
17-19 94 Yes 12 7.7 6.9 2.7 4.9 13.8 20.8
20-21 91 No 38 3.3 6.0 0.0 3.7 6.5 27.8
20-21 91 Yes 24 1.0 6.7 -0.1 2.4 4.7 31.3
20-21 92 No 38 3.1 5.0 0.6 2.9 5.4 25.4
20-21 92 Yes 24 1.0 5.1 -2.0 1.8 4.1 22.2
20-21 93 No 38 4.0 4.5 1.1 3.3 5.5 23.2
20-21 93 Yes 24 3.0 6.2 -1.5 2.5 6.5 29.1
20-21 94 No 38 6.9 6.1 2.3 5.7 10.4 27.6
20-21 94 Yes 24 5.5 6.0 2.3 4.2 8.7 28.5
22 91 No 59 2.7 5.5 0.7 3.6 5.8 31.6
(continued)
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Table A.1, continued
Industry,
Nace
YEAR Inno-
vations
Firms Profit,
mean
Profit,
std
25%
quartile
Profit,
median
75%
quartile
Range
of profit
22 91 Yes 38 4.9 6.6 -0.1 3.8 9.2 30.1
22 92 No 59 3.6 6.0 1.9 4.4 5.9 42.3
22 92 Yes 38 6.6 5.6 2.8 6.9 9.4 28.7
22 93 No 59 4.5 5.5 0.8 3.4 7.9 26.0
22 93 Yes 38 6.4 4.9 2.6 6.8 8.7 25.4
22 94 No 59 4.5 6.2 0.9 3.9 7.1 33.8
22 94 Yes 38 6.6 6.2 4.0 7.4 11.2 26.0
24-25 91 No 11 2.3 6.8 -0.5 2.6 6.3 24.7
24-25 91 Yes 16 5.9 7.2 2.0 4.7 8.9 32.1
24-25 92 No 11 5.7 7.4 0.7 5.8 10.9 26.2
24-25 92 Yes 16 6.9 6.0 3.9 5.2 8.2 25.2
24-25 93 No 11 4.3 8.7 -1.5 4.3 8.4 30.9
24-25 93 Yes 16 6.2 6.1 2.9 5.7 7.1 28.1
24-25 94 No 11 5.1 11.2 -1.0 5.4 13.9 36.2
24-25 94 Yes 16 6.8 6.1 3.8 5.8 9.1 28.3
26 91 No 20 3.1 8.1 0.3 3.0 8.3 34.9
26 91 Yes 14 6.0 5.5 0.7 6.0 9.1 17.7
26 92 No 20 2.4 9.8 1.5 3.9 5.7 40.8
26 92 Yes 14 6.4 6.4 1.3 5.8 12.0 21.2
26 93 No 20 4.3 6.7 0.7 3.4 7.9 28.7
26 93 Yes 14 7.2 7.5 2.8 6.8 14.6 23.2
26 94 No 20 7.4 5.6 3.8 6.6 10.0 19.0
26 94 Yes 14 7.8 5.7 2.9 7.1 11.6 18.9
27-28 91 No 60 3.8 7.5 0.2 4.6 7.2 45.7
27-28 91 Yes 27 3.2 6.9 1.9 4.2 6.3 34.4
27-28 92 No 60 3.5 7.6 -0.2 3.7 6.3 52.1
27-28 92 Yes 27 5.0 3.9 2.1 5.1 7.7 18.8
27-28 93 No 60 5.1 6.9 1.6 5.1 8.3 45.7
27-28 93 Yes 27 5.6 4.4 2.6 5.3 6.8 20.4
27-28 94 No 60 4.4 8.3 0.8 5.6 9.2 46.7
27-28 94 Yes 27 5.7 7.0 3.4 6.4 8.0 32.3
(continued)
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Table A.1, continued
Industry,
Nace
YEAR Inno-
vations
Firms Profit
mean
Profit
std
25%
quartile
Profit,
median
75%
quartile
Range of
profit
29 91 No 24 3.5 7.4 0.4 5.1 7.5 36.9
29 91 Yes 31 5.8 4.6 2.9 5.3 8.9 21.6
29 92 No 24 3.0 7.0 -0.7 4.8 7.1 28.9
29 92 Yes 31 4.4 8.4 1.2 5.5 8.9 52.4
29 93 No 24 4.9 6.8 1.8 5.8 7.2 29.7
29 93 Yes 31 5.5 9.5 2.0 4.4 9.7 55.7
29 94 No 24 4.5 8.6 2.3 5.6 9.1 43.1
29 94 Yes 31 5.9 6.3 1.9 4.5 10.5 26.7
30-33 91 No 15 6.2 7.2 3.5 5.2 9.3 30.6
30-33 91 Yes 23 5.3 5.5 1.1 4.4 8.5 20.9
30-33 92 No 15 6.5 5.3 3.2 6.6 9.5 20.6
30-33 92 Yes 23 5.0 3.1 2.6 4.6 6.6 13.1
30-33 93 No 15 7.1 7.7 3.7 5.7 12.5 32.6
30-33 93 Yes 23 5.1 4.4 2.3 5.0 9.3 17.1
30-33 94 No 15 5.7 8.7 1.6 7.8 10.7 33.4
30-33 94 Yes 23 4.4 5.9 2.4 4.0 7.4 29.9
34-35 91 No 33 3.2 3.9 1.9 3.3 5.6 21.0
34-35 91 Yes 21 4.8 3.9 2.1 4.1 7.0 13.9
34-35 92 No 33 4.0 4.8 1.8 3.8 6.2 23.3
34-35 92 Yes 21 3.7 5.2 1.5 4.0 6.7 23.3
34-35 93 No 33 3.5 6.9 1.1 3.5 4.7 44.9
34-35 93 Yes 21 2.7 4.3 1.3 2.7 5.7 17.6
34-35 94 No 33 3.5 5.8 1.8 3.4 6.3 33.4
34-35 94 Yes 21 2.7 6.9 1.6 2.4 6.2 35.0
36-37 91 No 22 2.9 4.1 1.2 2.2 4.5 18.3
36-37 91 Yes 18 2.4 6.3 -2.5 3.1 5.8 23.3
36-37 92 No 22 3.7 3.9 1.7 3.1 6.0 15.8
36-37 92 Yes 18 2.8 6.2 1.2 3.6 7.0 26.0
36-37 93 No 22 5.0 5.0 0.6 5.1 9.2 19.3
36-37 93 Yes 18 3.1 5.7 -0.6 3.7 6.7 21.8
36-37 94 No 22 5.4 4.7 2.4 4.1 8.4 17.6
36-37 94 Yes 18 5.4 6.0 1.8 4.4 9.3 27.2
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Table A.2. Return on total assets (ROTA) according to innovation activities, panel
1991-94, product or process innovations, ROTA between -30, +50 % each
year (data for figures 3.2 and 3.6)
Industry,
Nace
YEAR Inno-
vations
Firms Profit,
mean
Profit,
std
25%
quartile
Profit,
median
75%
quartile
Range
of profit
15-37 91 No 349 8.8 10.6 3.2 9.2 14.6 65.9
15-37 91 Yes 270 9.4 9.2 4.4 9.0 14.8 67.4
15-37 92 No 349 9.4 9.7 4.8 10.0 15.6 64.8
15-37 92 Yes 270 10.1 8.6 6.1 10.1 14.7 67.0
15-37 93 No 349 10.5 10.1 5.0 10.3 16.1 70.8
15-37 93 Yes 270 10.4 9.3 5.1 9.8 15.2 61.9
15-37 94 No 349 10.5 10.8 4.7 9.3 17.3 76.7
15-37 94 Yes 270 10.1 9.7 4.9 9.8 15.8 66.7
15-16 91 No 54 9.2 9.4 4.9 9.5 14.3 46.2
15-16 91 Yes 45 8.7 8.8 5.0 9.0 14.1 52.2
15-16 92 No 54 9.9 9.3 5.1 10.6 15.6 48.6
15-16 92 Yes 45 11.5 8.0 8.2 11.5 16.1 43.0
15-16 93 No 54 12.9 8.1 7.3 12.1 16.1 43.2
15-16 93 Yes 45 11.7 8.3 7.4 11.8 15.7 50.8
15-16 94 No 54 10.3 9.5 5.1 9.2 18.0 46.6
15-16 94 Yes 45 8.4 11.1 3.7 8.9 14.8 58.9
17-19 91 No 22 11.2 12.0 5.7 10.3 18.1 49.1
17-19 91 Yes 12 10.6 6.9 5.5 10.4 13.5 22.0
17-19 92 No 22 10.3 7.0 6.7 10.7 14.5 29.5
17-19 92 Yes 12 8.3 7.1 3.1 9.8 12.8 22.1
17-19 93 No 22 11.7 12.1 6.2 13.2 18.6 55.8
17-19 93 Yes 12 9.2 7.4 4.1 8.1 14.3 27.0
17-19 94 No 22 12.3 10.3 6.1 13.0 16.5 48.2
17-19 94 Yes 12 14.3 12.3 5.7 8.9 21.9 35.9
20-21 91 No 38 6.3 10.5 0.2 9.3 14.8 48.3
20-21 91 Yes 23 4.7 9.4 1.9 6.0 9.8 39.2
20-21 92 No 38 6.8 8.1 3.1 7.4 11.6 41.6
20-21 92 Yes 23 4.3 9.1 -1.9 4.2 9.9 39.9
20-21 93 No 38 7.9 8.0 3.6 7.3 12.3 44.6
20-21 93 Yes 23 6.0 10.3 -1.9 5.9 11.0 49.5
20-21 94 No 38 12.3 10.0 5.5 11.0 18.0 45.7
20-21 94 Yes 23 9.4 10.4 3.5 9.1 13.3 53.0
(continued)
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Table A.2 continued
Industry
Nace
YEAR Inno-
vations
Firms Profit
mean
Profit
std
25%
quartile
Profit,
median
75%
quartile
Range of
profit
22 91 No 53 8.3 10.8 4.4 10.0 13.0 58.1
22 91 Yes 39 9.7 11.3 3.5 8.7 15.2 63.1
22 92 No 53 10.4 10.5 6.4 11.0 17.2 64.8
22 92 Yes 39 13.2 8.6 7.6 12.8 19.7 35.6
22 93 No 53 10.0 8.6 5.0 10.5 15.2 49.0
22 93 Yes 39 13.1 9.7 6.9 12.0 17.4 51.7
22 94 No 53 8.5 7.9 3.7 8.3 12.8 44.4
22 94 Yes 39 11.8 10.2 7.2 13.7 18.5 45.6
24-25 91 No 11 4.8 12.4 2.7 6.4 10.6 49.4
24-25 91 Yes 16 10.5 8.0 5.2 10.0 14.5 27.4
24-25 92 No 11 8.3 12.2 3.2 8.3 17.5 44.3
24-25 92 Yes 16 12.1 5.7 8.4 10.0 15.1 22.4
24-25 93 No 11 7.2 15.2 -2.0 9.8 20.2 52.0
24-25 93 Yes 16 11.8 9.0 4.4 12.2 15.5 34.8
24-25 94 No 11 9.9 20.0 -0.7 10.0 20.4 71.8
24-25 94 Yes 16 12.4 8.1 7.1 11.8 13.5 33.2
26 91 No 20 8.4 11.3 2.7 7.3 16.0 44.2
26 91 Yes 14 10.7 9.3 2.6 9.7 16.1 31.9
26 92 No 20 7.8 13.3 5.6 9.2 14.5 52.0
26 92 Yes 14 11.2 11.4 3.9 9.6 16.0 44.7
26 93 No 20 9.4 9.4 2.5 8.7 16.9 33.2
26 93 Yes 14 10.3 11.4 7.0 9.4 16.6 41.5
26 94 No 20 14.3 9.9 6.1 11.1 20.5 37.0
26 94 Yes 14 11.5 7.0 7.8 10.4 16.9 26.1
27-28 91 No 58 10.5 11.6 2.8 11.7 17.8 55.9
27-28 91 Yes 28 9.4 9.0 6.9 9.7 15.0 46.1
27-28 92 No 58 8.6 9.9 1.0 8.8 15.6 47.9
27-28 92 Yes 28 9.8 6.0 6.8 10.0 12.8 33.8
27-28 93 No 58 10.3 11.0 4.7 9.7 16.1 63.6
27-28 93 Yes 28 10.9 7.0 6.3 10.5 12.7 33.0
27-28 94 No 58 10.5 12.4 2.6 12.3 18.7 61.0
27-28 94 Yes 28 10.6 11.9 6.1 10.2 13.8 58.3
(continued)
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Table A.2 continued
Industry
Nace
YEAR Inno-
vations
Firms Profit,
mean
Profit,
std
25%
quartile
Profit,
median
75%
quartile
Range of
profit
29 91 No 22 9.2 12.2 2.8 8.7 16.5 52.8
29 91 Yes 31 10.1 5.7 5.9 9.4 14.4 23.0
29 92 No 22 10.1 10.7 1.7 13.6 16.9 36.8
29 92 Yes 31 9.1 8.7 5.3 9.7 14.9 44.5
29 93 No 22 12.7 12.8 7.3 11.5 19.1 60.2
29 93 Yes 31 9.5 9.6 4.1 9.0 15.8 45.7
29 94 No 22 12.5 11.0 5.8 11.9 19.5 46.3
29 94 Yes 31 8.9 8.3 2.7 6.9 15.3 27.3
30-33 91 No 15 11.9 11.5 6.0 10.1 18.8 46.3
30-33 91 Yes 23 11.2 9.2 4.5 9.6 14.6 36.8
30-33 92 No 15 12.0 9.5 6.6 10.0 21.0 37.1
30-33 92 Yes 23 11.0 6.2 8.4 11.3 13.6 33.0
30-33 93 No 15 12.1 10.8 7.6 11.5 17.6 46.7
30-33 93 Yes 23 12.3 9.0 5.0 11.7 20.4 29.4
30-33 94 No 15 8.7 14.7 3.5 13.5 19.8 52.2
30-33 94 Yes 23 9.0 8.3 5.5 8.0 13.2 36.5
34-35 91 No 34 8.5 7.2 5.0 8.6 13.2 35.3
34-35 91 Yes 21 12.8 9.9 6.0 9.0 19.2 43.4
34-35 92 No 34 11.0 10.4 5.2 10.2 15.6 52.0
34-35 92 Yes 21 11.7 10.8 5.8 11.2 16.4 53.0
34-35 93 No 34 9.1 9.9 3.5 8.9 13.8 47.4
34-35 93 Yes 21 9.1 10.4 3.2 9.4 12.7 49.8
34-35 94 No 34 7.1 10.1 3.3 7.3 12.5 56.1
34-35 94 Yes 21 8.1 7.4 3.4 6.7 12.3 31.0
36-37 91 No 22 6.8 9.3 4.9 5.6 9.3 50.9
36-37 91 Yes 18 6.5 10.2 -3.6 5.8 15.4 29.5
36-37 92 No 22 8.9 6.5 6.2 8.5 14.4 25.3
36-37 92 Yes 18 6.0 10.0 2.9 7.7 10.3 42.2
36-37 93 No 22 11.2 10.8 2.9 11.5 19.6 42.8
36-37 93 Yes 18 6.9 9.4 -0.4 8.0 15.3 31.8
36-37 94 No 22 12.2 10.1 4.9 8.5 20.6 37.5
36-37 94 Yes 18 10.0 7.9 5.1 9.0 16.1 34.1
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Table A.3. Product-process innovators. Median operating profit 1991-94 (short
panel) by industry. Only categories with at least 3 observations reported.
INDUSTRY Year
Product
innovators
Product and
process
 innovators
Process
innovators
Food, beverages and tobacco 1991 3,7 3,0 3,7
Food, beverages and tobacco 1992 4,5 3,3 3,9
Food, beverages and tobacco 1993 7,9 5,3 4,1
Food, beverages and tobacco 1994 6,7 3,1 2,1
Textiles, wearing apparel, fur and leather 1991 6,0 6,4
Textiles, wearing apparel, fur and leather 1992 5,4 5,3
Textiles, wearing apparel, fur and leather 1993 5,1 3,2
Textiles, wearing apparel, fur and leather 1994 8,5 2,7
Wood products, pulp and paper 1991 1,6 2,4
Wood products, pulp and paper 1992 1,7 3,1
Wood products, pulp and paper 1993 2,7 2,5
Wood products, pulp and paper 1994 4,0 6,1
Publishing and printing 1991 4,4 3,7
Publishing and printing 1992 3,1 7,3
Publishing and printing 1993 2,2 7,5
Publishing and printing 1994 9,6 6,9
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 1991 3,7
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 1992 4,6
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 1993 5,4
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 1994 5,8
Mineral products 1991 4,9 5,2
Mineral products 1992 7,8 3,9
Mineral products 1993 5,3 5,2
Mineral products 1994 8,6 3,9
Basic metals, metal products 1991 3,5 4,5 4,2
Basic metals, metal products 1992 3,6 2,9 6,9
Basic metals, metal products 1993 2,2 5,3 5,5
Basic metals, metal products 1994 4,9 5,7 6,6
Machinery and equipment 1991 6,1 4,6 1,6
Machinery and equipment 1992 3,8 5,5 8,9
Machinery and equipment 1993 5,3 4,2 5,0
Machinery and equipment 1994 9,7 4,3 3,6
Electrical and optical equipment, incl. IT 1991 5,7 3,7
Electrical and optical equipment, incl. IT 1992 3,7 5,2
Electrical and optical equipment, incl. IT 1993 5,7 4,0
Electrical and optical equipment, incl. IT 1994 4,8 2,8
Transport equipment 1991 4,5 6,2 2,9
Transport equipment 1992 3,8 5,6 3,4
Transport equipment 1993 3,3 3,3 2,7
Transport equipment 1994 2,9 4,9 2,4
Furniture, recycling 1991 -2,5 3,1 12,5
Furniture, recycling 1992 2,9 2,1 5,2
Furniture, recycling 1993 3,8 3,3 4,1
Furniture, recycling 1994 6,4 2,6 9,8
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Table A.4. Product-process innovators. Median ROTA 1991-94 (short panel) by size
classes.
INDUSTRY Year
Product
innovators
Product and
process
innovators
Process
innovators
Food, beverages and tobacco 1991 7,4 8,9 10,1
Food, beverages and tobacco 1992 10,8 12,3 11,1
Food, beverages and tobacco 1993 15,2 12,6 9,5
Food, beverages and tobacco 1994 11,6 10,1 5,7
Textiles, wearing apparel, fur and leather 1991 10,4 15,4
Textiles, wearing apparel, fur and leather 1992 9,8 11,3
Textiles, wearing apparel, fur and leather 1993 9,1 5,7
Textiles, wearing apparel, fur and leather 1994 12,0 8,8
Wood products, pulp and paper 1991 4,7 8,8
Wood products, pulp and paper 1992 4,2 9,9
Wood products, pulp and paper 1993 5,6 8,2
Wood products, pulp and paper 1994 7,4 11,2
Publishing and printing 1991 8,7 8,8
Publishing and printing 1992 6,8 12,9
Publishing and printing 1993 9,0 12,0
Publishing and printing 1994 16,8 13,2
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 1991 7,8
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 1992 9,5
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 1993 11,8
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 1994 12,5
Mineral products 1991 8,8 7,6
Mineral products 1992 14,1 6,7
Mineral products 1993 8,5 8,3
Mineral products 1994 14,2 8,2
Basic metals, metal products 1991 8,6 9,4 10,4
Basic metals, metal products 1992 10,6 7,8 12,5
Basic metals, metal products 1993 12,2 10,5 9,8
Basic metals, metal products 1994 12,4 10,1 10,1
Machinery and equipment 1991 13,2 9,4 3,9
Machinery and equipment 1992 6,9 9,7 14,5
Machinery and equipment 1993 9,0 8,4 11,0
Machinery and equipment 1994 19,8 6,5 5,6
Electrical and optical equipment, incl. IT 1991 12,0 8,5
Electrical and optical equipment, incl. IT 1992 10,1 11,5
Electrical and optical equipment, incl. IT 1993 12,8 10,7
Electrical and optical equipment, incl. IT 1994 10,4 6,3
Transport equipment 1991 7,7 17,6 9,0
Transport equipment 1992 10,2 15,8 8,9
Transport equipment 1993 6,7 8,9 9,8
Transport equipment 1994 5,3 9,5 6,7
Furniture, recycling 1991 -6,4 5,8 17,6
Furniture, recycling 1992 7,4 7,3 9,9
Furniture, recycling 1993 8,0 7,8 8,0
Furniture, recycling 1994 9,6 7,8 13,9
Innovation, firm profitability and growth 67
Table A.5. Correlations of innovation inputs 1992 with operating profit, return on
total assets and salesgrowth 1991-1994, by innovation types. Short panel.
N 1991 1992 1993 1994
R&D-INT 1992 with OPR 1991-94
All 293 -.10 .22** .09 -.07
Product only innovators 42 .20 -.01 .03 -.08
Product and process innovators 145 -.12 .29** .13 -.09
Process only innovators 86 .27* .28** .28* .17
R&D-INT 1992 with ROTA 1991-94
All 293 -.22** .14* .06 -.04
Product only innovators 42 .28 .11 .15 -.14
Product and process innovators 145 -.28** .23** .10 -.05
Process only innovators 86 .18 .17 .20 .08
INNO-INT 1992 with OPR 1991-94
All 282 -.00 .17** .07 -.03
Product only innovators 42 -.02 .07 .03 .01
Product and process innovators 146 .01 .18* .09 -.05
Process only innovators 87 .03 .18 .08 .04
INNO-INT 1992 with ROTA 1991-94
All 282 -.10 .09 .01 -.03
Product only innovators 42 .14 .14 .15 .09
Product and process innovators 146 -.13 .13 .04 -.01
Process only innovators 87 .02 .06 -.05 -.05
** p<.01; *.01<= p <= .05
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Table A.6. Correlations of innovation inputs 1992 with operating profit, return on
total assets and salesgrowth 1991-1994, by size classes. Short panel.
N 1991 1992 1993 1994
R&D-INT 1992 with OPR 1991-94
All
Small firms (1-19 emp) 54 -.71** .26 -.37** -.37**
Medium sized firms (20-49 emp) 43 -.04 -.16 -.09 -.06
Medium sized firms (50-99 emp) 53 -.11 -.25 .17 -.45**
Large firms (100-199 emp) 58 -.09 .11 .04 -.16
Large firms (200 + emp) 65 .65** .59** .59** .51**
R&D-INT 1992 with ROTA 1991-94
All
Small firms (1-19 emp) 54 -.66** .21 -.19 -.19
Medium sized firms (20-49 emp) 43 -.03 -.13 .09 -.02
Medium sized firms (50-99 emp) 53 -.13 -.16 .00 -.18
Large firms (100-199 emp) 58 -.05 .17 .13 -.11
Large firms (200 + emp) 65 .32** .40** .41** .23
R&D-INT 1992 with SALES 1992-94
All
Small firms (1-19 emp) 54 .05 -.15 -.06
Medium sized firms (20-49 emp) 43 -.13 -.07 -.16
Medium sized firms (50-99 emp) 53 .32* .48** .36**
Large firms (100-199 emp) 58 -.06 .12 .12
Large firms (200 + emp) 65 .02 .08 .02
INNO-INT 1992 with OPR 1991-94
All
Small firms (1-19 emp) 54 -.50** .35** -.29* -.29*
Medium sized firms (20-49 emp) 43 .04 -.05 .09 .11
Medium sized firms (50-99 emp) 53 .05 -.13 .22 -.33*
Large firms (100-199 emp) 59 -.11 .06 -.07 -.18
Large firms (200 + emp) 66 .35** .28* .25* .20
INNO-INT 1992 with ROTA 1991-94
All
Small firms (1-19 emp) 54 -.50** .24 -.20 -.23
Medium sized firms (20-49 emp) 43 .02 -.14 .00 .06
Medium sized firms (50-99 emp) 53 .05 -.08 .04 -.10
Large firms (100-199 emp) 59 -.11 .06 -.07 -.18
Large firms (200 + emp) 66 .15 .16 .12 .07
INNO-INT 1992 with SALES 1992-94
All
Small firms (1-19 emp) 54 .14 -.04 .05
Medium sized firms (20-49 emp) 43 -.17 -.07 .01
Medium sized firms (50-99 emp) 53 .38** .48** .36**
Large firms (100-199 emp) 59 -.06 .04 .08
Large firms (200 + emp) 66 .04 .04 -.01
** p<.01; *.01<= p <= .05
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Appendix B: Questionnaire
(E.C. Harmonised Innovation Surveys 1992/1993 - Final Questionnaire)
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EHVOXWQLQJVWDNHUH PHG IRUVNQLQJ NQ\WWHW WLO DOOH
VLGHU YHG LQQRYDVMRQ RJ WHNQRORJLVN HQGULQJ PHG
V UOLJ YHNW Sn IRUKROGHW PHOORP LQQRYDVMRQ
¡NRQRPLVN YHNVW RJ GH VDPIXQQVPHVVLJH
RPJLYHOVHU %DVLV IRU JUXSSHQV DUEHLG HU
HUNMHQQHOVHQ DY DW XWYLNOLQJHQ LQQHQ YLWHQVNDS RJ
WHNQRORJLHU IXQGDPHQWDO IRU¡NRQRPLVNYHNVW’HW
JMHQVWnU OLNHYHO PDQJH XO¡VWH SUREOHPHU RPNULQJ
KYRUGDQ SURVHVVHQ PHG YLWHQVNDSHOLJ RJ
WHNQRORJLVN HQGULQJ IRUO¡SHU RJ KYRUGDQ GHQQH
SURVHVVHQ InU VDPIXQQVPHVVLJH RJ ¡NRQRPLVNH
NRQVHNYHQVHU)RUVWnHOVHDYGHQQHSURVHVVHQHUDY
VWRUEHW\GQLQJIRUXWIRUPLQJHQRJLYHUNVHWWHOVHQDY
IRUVNQLQJV WHNQRORJL RJ LQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNHQ
)RUVNQLQJHQ L 67(3JUXSSHQ HU GHUIRU VHQWUHUW
RPNULQJ KLVWRULVNH ¡NRQRPLVNH VRVLRORJLVNH RJ
RUJDQLVDWRULVNH VS¡UVPnO VRP HU UHOHYDQWH IRU GH
EUHGH IHOWHQH LQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNN RJ ¡NRQRPLVN
YHNVW
7KH67(3JURXSZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQWRVXSSRUW
SROLF\PDNHUV ZLWK UHVHDUFK RQ DOO DVSHFWV RI
LQQRYDWLRQDQGWHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHZLWKSDUWLFXODU
HPSKDVLV RQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ LQQRYDWLRQ
HFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGWKHVRFLDO FRQWH[W7KHEDVLV
RIWKHJURXS•VZRUNLVWKHUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWVFLHQFH
WHFKQRORJ\ DQG LQQRYDWLRQ DUH IXQGDPHQWDO WR
HFRQRPLFJURZWK\HWWKHUHUHPDLQPDQ\XQUHVROYHG
SUREOHPVDERXWKRZWKHSURFHVVHVRIVFLHQWLILFDQG
WHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHDFWXDOO\RFFXUDQGDERXWKRZ
WKH\ KDYH VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF LPSDFWV 5HVROYLQJ
VXFK SUREOHPV LV FHQWUDO WR WKH IRUPDWLRQ DQG
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI VFLHQFH WHFKQRORJ\ DQG
LQQRYDWLRQ SROLF\ 7KH UHVHDUFK RI WKH 67(3 JURXS
FHQWUHV RQ KLVWRULFDO HFRQRPLF VRFLDO DQG
RUJDQLVDWLRQDO LVVXHV UHOHYDQW IRU EURDG ILHOGV RI
LQQRYDWLRQSROLF\DQGHFRQRPLFJURZWK
